

Social Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

Integration – Reconciliation – Stagnation

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Introduction

This publication is the successor to the book *Troubled Transition. Social Democracy in East-Central Europe* (published in 1999) by Michael Dauderstädt, André Gerrits and György Márkus. When we finished the manuscript of that book, social democracy ruled in most of Western Europe while the East seemed to be solidly in the grip of the 'right'. Three years later, the picture looks quite the opposite. Social democrats have lost power in a series of elections in member states of the European Union (EU) while they have regained power in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, among other countries. The variance of political developments seems particularly relevant at a time when the greater Europe is moving closer in terms of foreign policy and economic relations: Russia is approaching the West after September 11, the Balkan countries are involved in the Stability Pact, and East-Central Europe is finishing the accession negotiations with the EU.

The present book focuses on the recent development of the social-democratic left in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, we do not deal with the most eastern, non-European part of the former post-communist world, i.e. central Asia where there is anyway hardly any real democracy, let alone social democracy. What do we mean by social democracy in these transition countries? In our view, a political party or force claiming to be social-democratic should basically fulfil three criteria aiming at core values such as:

- democracy, i.e. respect of human rights and multi-party democracy;
- social market economy, i.e. pragmatic continuation of the reforms which transform the old planned economy into a modern market economy that cares for the socially weak;
- peace, i.e. the non-violent resolution of conflicts between nations and ethnic groups.

Through these three criteria, social democrats can be discerned from their major political competitors:

- from the radical nationalists who want to assert national interests always against and at the expense of other nations or minorities;
- from the liberals who want to eliminate the 'social' attribute from the market economy and who want to pursue reforms in a radical and ideological rather than pragmatic fashion;
- from the communists, who want to slow down, stop or reverse the reforms.

The development of the social-democratic parties reflects to a large extent the general political development in Central and Eastern Europe. The two most important issues have been system change and national independence, the latter being relevant in all new countries. These issues created specific cleavages in the societies and polities of the transition countries. System change put anti-communist forces against the ruling communist parties. The struggle for national sovereignty places independence movements and related forces against those in favour of maintaining the status of a more or less autonomous part of a larger federation (be it the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or the Yugoslav Federal Republic). Different transitions provide for different cleavage structures. While the socio-economic cleavage between 'left' and 'right' (a dichotomy which has actually lost a great deal of its relevance in Eastern Europe), or in Herbert Kitschelt's terms between 'social protectionism' versus 'market liberalism'^[1], has been particularly powerful in the Czech Republic, the political-cultural cleavage between 'secular libertarians' and 'religious authoritarians' has been more pronounced in Poland and Hungary. Sometimes that meant that traditional left-right issues were of a subordinated importance.^[2] Nonetheless, social democrats had to take sides in these national cleavage structures as all major parties.

Given the difficulties to define social democracy and social-democratic policies and positions in the transition countries, we opted for a more formal approach by accepting those parties as social-democratic that have been acknowledged by the Socialist International (SI) and become members of the SI or, at least, gained consultative or observer status. Obviously, that solution carries difficulties of its own, as SI approval occurs at a certain moment during a long-term process of party development that is by no means always a linear evolution. Some parties got admitted by the SI early and ran into problems later (e.g. the Hungarian or Slovenian social democrats). SI approval sometimes reflects less programmatic pureness or 'correct' social-democratic policies but strong domestic influence (i.e. electoral victories) or foreign policies which were particularly appreciated by powerful SI member parties. In the statistical annexes of this book, this approach implies the characterisation of a party as social-democratic regardless of the time of its SI affiliation. In some countries one could argue that social democrats have always been strong but not yet acknowledged as such (e.g. Bulgaria, where the main post-communist successor party was very slow in changing its ways but will probably enter the SI sometime soon).

Troubled Transition described and explained these developments in more depth by going back to the origins of Central and Eastern Europe's social democracy in the last century until the collapse of communism, analysing its role during the transition process and reflecting on its identity after communism. The authors saw a strong potential for social-democratic parties in the post-communist societies thanks to their rather egalitarian traditions, and to mounting social problems such as increased unemployment, inequality and

poverty. As it turned out, social-democratic parties were rather seldom able to mobilise that potential. They often lost out to other forces, lately often national-populist ones, which used social-democratic rhetoric more efficiently and convincingly than the social democrats themselves.

The present book resulted from frequent requests to up-date *Troubled Transition*, in particular the annexes on elections and parties. The annexes have been updated, and in addition, we elaborated on recent developments of social-democratic parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the regional differences described above, it makes sense to deal with our subject in three different chapters where we analyse the different challenges and responses of social-democratic forces in their respective socio-political environment. In chapter 1, we start with the countries associated to the EU whose political and economic agenda is to an ever-increasing extent determined and dominated by EU accession and its preparation. Chapter 2 focuses on the Stability Pact countries, i.e. the successor countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania where reconstruction and conflict resolution are the political priorities. Chapter 3 covers the republics of the former Soviet Union except the Baltic states which are candidate countries, and Central Asia where social democracy is traditionally very weak.

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The Accession Countries – Integration

The Accession Countries – Integration

In the perspective of transition, most institutions and analysts think that the ten candidate countries^[3] have completed the transition from communist dictatorship and planned economy to a democratic market economy. They get good rankings regarding freedom and democracy from human rights watchdogs^[4] as well as regarding liberalisation and privatisation from international organisations such as the OECD or the EBRD. The EU has screened the candidate countries during the last years in order to assess how far they fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria which include not only democracy, human rights and a market economy but also competitive strength and compliance with the *acquis communautaire*. The judgement of the EU Commission varies from country to country, but eight (the ten except Bulgaria and Romania) are considered to be most probably ready for accession in 2004.

Party development

There are social-democratic parties with full membership in the Socialist International (SI) in all ten applicant countries, in some countries even more than one. The parties emerged from different political backgrounds and organisational histories. Some are re-founded historical parties (e.g. the Czech social democrats), some a product of the broader anti-communist opposition movement (e.g. the Polish Labour Union which emerged from Solidarnosc), some are the reformed and 'social democratised' former communist parties (e.g. the Hungarian socialists or the Polish social democrats). The following table 1.1 gives an overview which shows that the strongest social-democratic parties can be found in the highly developed, rapidly reforming Visegrad countries that had relatively few problems concerning their national identity: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

In these three countries, social democrats have won elections and led governments. In 2001, the Polish social democrats, as well as the Hungarian Socialists in 2002 even returned to power after a second spell in the opposition – a rare feat among all parties in Central and Eastern Europe regardless of their political orientation. An equally rare success was achieved by the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD). They won a second term by becoming the strongest party in the elections of June 2002, thus repeating the exceptional success of their traditional competitor Vaclav Klaus of the conservative-liberal ODS who was the only head of government in Central and Eastern Europe who was immediately re-elected in free and fair elections (1996).

These victories are due to a combination of organisational strength and

political continuity. The Polish and Hungarian parties are well organised with a relatively high number of party members. They have successfully offered a policy model that continues economic reform, respects and strengthens the democratic culture and pursues European integration. Even the defeats that both parties suffered after their first term was due to a new unity of the conservative side rather than to a strong disappointment of their own electorate. They actually maintained their share of the vote to a large extent. The Czech party is somewhat weaker in terms of organisation and membership but obviously succeeded in mobilising most of their voters in spite of a strong competitor on the left, the Czech and Moravian Communist Party (CSCM) which won 18%.

Table 1.1: social-democratic parties in the accession countries

Country	Party	Historical Background	SI Status	Strength
Bulgaria	BSDP	historic	Full member	Very weak
	Euroleft	Reform wing of former communists	Observer	Very weak
Czech Republic	CSSD	historic	Full member	Strong
Estonia	Moderates	Merger of two parties, both founded after 1990, one historical	Full member	Medium
Hungary	MSZP	Reformed former communists	Full member	Strong
	MSZDP	historic	Consultative	Very weak
Latvia	LSDSP	Merger of reformed communists (LSDP) and historic party (LSDSP)	Full member	Medium
Lithuania	LSDP	Part of Sajudis	Full member	Part of a strong coalition
Poland	SLD	Reformed former communists	Full member	Strong
	UP	Emerged from Solidarnosc	Full member	Weak
Romania	PSD	Merger between split-off from former communists (PDSR) and historic party (PSDR)	No member	Strong
	PD	Democratic Party of Romania	Full member	Medium
Slovakia	SDL	Reformed former communists	Full member	Split in 2002
	SSSD	Historic	Full member	Weak
Slovenia	ZLSD	Reformed former communists	Full member	Medium
	SDSS	Party of the 'Slovene Spring', part of DEMOS, historic roots	Denounced consultative membership	Medium

The development of the social-democratic parties reflects to a large extent the general political development in the ten countries.^[5] The two most important issues have been system change and national independence, the

latter being relevant in all new nations, i.e. the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia. These issues created specific cleavages in the societies and politics of the transition countries. System change put anti-communist forces against the ruling communist parties. The struggle for national sovereignty put independence movements and related forces against those in favour of maintaining the status of a more or less autonomous part of a larger federation (be it the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or the Yugoslav Federal Republic).

The depth and durability of the first cleavage depended on various factors. In some countries (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) the ruling communists accepted the change in round table debates with the opposition or even played a catalytic role. They then participated in the democratic elections on equal terms (except in the Polish founding elections, where two thirds of the seats in the Sejm had been reserved for the then ruling communists), losing, as a rule, the first founding elections but often winning the next round. The peaceful change contributed to a 'normal', democratic competitive relationship between the reformed ex-communist parties and their liberal-conservative foes transforming the respective politics to a large extent into traditional left-right systems. However, the past has sometimes been used as a weapon in the electoral and ideological struggle. The Czech case has been exceptional in so far as the communists hardly reformed themselves and the left-right conflict took place between the historic social democrats and the liberal-conservative parties. In the early phase of transition, the Czech social democrats had close ties to the Civic Forum, the anti-communist opposition movement, which later fragmented into various liberal and conservative parties. In the slowly reforming countries Bulgaria and Romania, where the post-communist parties continued to rule after 1989 albeit in a more democratic manner, the anti-communist cleavage continued to play a major role with the historic social democrats usually being part of the opposition movement. In the new states, the system cleavage has often been less dominant as even national communist parties supported or fought for national independence (e.g. in Slovenia or Latvia).

Whatever the original pattern of cleavages during the early years of transition has been, it lost its relevance with the completion of the transition itself. On the one hand, nobody, even orthodox communists, could be suspected anymore of seriously intending to re-establish a party dictatorship or a planned economy. Similarly, the struggle for national independence lost its importance after sovereignty was being secured by international diplomatic recognition and treaties. On the other hand, new problems became much more important. The transition has led to a recession in the short run (two or three years after 1989) and to rising unemployment and inequality in the longer run. Even in 2000, many post-communist economies had not yet returned to the level of output and income of 1989.^[6] Many people felt frustrated and disappointed by the results of the system change. Approval rates regarding the new system declined in many countries (see table 2). Left-wing parties

tended to benefit from these developments as they are regarded as forces that protect the welfare state and correct socially unacceptable market outcomes. They thus recovered from the negative impact of anti-socialist feelings and tendencies of the early transition period when the bad memories of communism had still dominated the minds of the voters.

Party structures and strategies reflected that process. While there originally was not much love between ex-communist parties and social democrats (being historic or part of the opposition movement) they later tended to co-operate, to form electoral coalitions or even to merge (e.g. in Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). That rapprochement sometimes was hard to swallow by members of historic parties who had been persecuted by the communists during their long dictatorship. However, it has well fit western intentions. The SI has generally not been very happy with the competing existence of two or more social-democratic parties in the same country, especially if all of them have been too weak as isolated forces to have a powerful influence in their countries.

State-building has experienced a similar shift of relevance. After achieving independence some problems remained, like the exact definition of borders or citizenship, or the sharing of assets and liabilities. But the more these questions have been resolved the less these issues preoccupied national politics. Mostly, social-democratic parties have anyway had but a soft position on national issues. To them, national independence was a pre-condition or the appropriate framework to achieve social or democratic goals rather than a goal in itself. In some cases, where national identity required independence very strongly, e.g. the Baltics, social democrats were no exception and supported sovereignty and nation-building. Contrary to nationalist or conservative parties, however, they seldom had exclusive perceptions of citizenship or strong territorial instincts. That has not impeded social democrats from playing the national card in order to get more votes (e.g. the CSSD, and in particular its long-time chairman, prime minister Milos Zeman, in the Czech Republic).

The key problems of transition: economic modernisation and social crisis

Transition basically wanted to achieve democracy by destroying the communist party dictatorship, prosperity by replacing the unproductive planned economy by a modern market economy, and in many countries national independence by dissolving federations dominated by Russians, Serbs or Czechs. Most opposition elites saw these objectives as mutually reinforcing. Similarly the weaknesses of the old system created a vicious circle of repression and inefficiency. Economic failure was a major force for change. Communism would hardly have collapsed so rapidly and completely if it had achieved a better economic performance, i.e. not falling more and more behind the living standards and consumption opportunities of western capi-

talist societies. Already the communists, when still ruling, tried to reform their economies, occasionally introducing market elements in order to improve productivity and output. The failure of these reforms contributed to a large extent to the decision to take reforms much farther into the political realm itself.

Obviously, the building of capitalism is not a genuinely social-democratic task. However, modern, western social democracy has made its peace with modern capitalism to whose shaping it has largely contributed. In the transition countries, social democrats had the opportunity to create capitalism with a human face from scratch. They participated in the rapidly evolving debate on how fast and radically the old communist system should be reformed (e.g. gradualism vs. shock therapy). Leftist parties generally favoured a more careful pace of reform, a stronger role of and for the state, and policies mitigating the social consequences of reforms. After the general setting of the capitalist stage by liberalising prices and foreign trade, and privatising large parts of the state-owned enterprises, the actual play to be played on that stage became subject to a political and ideological debate. There are, after all, different 'varieties of capitalism'^[7] and 'worlds of welfare state'.^[8] The final goal of transition (the type of economy, society, welfare state) has been hardly clear during the first years of transition, though probably clearer among the left who preferred a European welfare state than among the right who oscillated between Thatcherism, neo-liberalism, economic nationalism, social conservatism and religious concepts of society. The preferences of voters in Central and Eastern Europe have generally been in favour of less inequality but they have had no clear strategies about how to achieve that goal.

In many cases, the actual development in the transition countries confronted the social-democratic parties that came into power with the basic task of building and/or stabilising capitalism. Ex-communist parties might have taken on that job with greater conviction than others as they often included a group of 'red managers', i.e. former *nomenclature* members who now headed or owned privatised enterprises and potentially benefited from stable capitalist conditions. In slow reforming countries like Bulgaria and Romania, where the ex-communists delayed the reforms, social democrats had to join forces with other opposition parties in order to get reforms moving in the first place. But even in apparently fast reforming countries, like Hungary or the Czech Republic, social-democratic parties had to implement sometimes harsh policies in order to establish capitalism because their conservative or liberal predecessors had failed to do the job. In Hungary in the mid-90s, the MSZP had to stabilise an economy it had inherited from Antall's MDF. Too much foreign debt and high deficits had to be reduced by painful austerity policies which contributed to its electoral defeat in 1998. In the Czech Republic, social democrats had to start structural adjustment in banking and manufacturing which had been postponed by the pseudo-privatisation implemented by Vaclav Klaus' ODS. Klaus government lost power in the wake

of a massive foreign exchange and banking crisis, and prolonged stagnation of the Czech economy.

Capitalism brought inevitably with it a rise of inequality, often poverty and unemployment. Only some countries during some periods succeeded in reducing at least unemployment. In most cases, modernising the economy and ensuring competitiveness implied large lay-offs in over-manned industries. New jobs in the service sector or in foreign owned enterprises emerged too slowly. While paid employment declined, the state's capacity to pay for income maintenance declined, too. Originally more generous systems of unemployment benefits had to be retrenched. Pension systems were to be based on different pillars where only a minimum income would be guaranteed by the public pillar. Poverty increased in most countries.

The disappointed population reacted angrily and disgruntledly (see table 1.2), though there are some interesting differences. Discontent has run particularly high in some fast reformers (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia), while Poland and Romania show improvement, probably because Romania was still looking forward to the impact of reform and Poland in 1998 was enjoying a boom that ended in 2001. In a few cases, satisfaction with democracy has grown even when the market lost its appeal, e.g. in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia after the falls of Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar. Still, the general mood has been rather gloomy. Short spells of optimism during growth periods mostly ended in despair about the next shock. Actually, by 2001 only a few countries had reached again the income level of 1989.

Table 1.2: Changing Attitudes towards the market and democracy

Country	Pro market in 1992	Pro market in 1998	Satisfied with development of democracy in 1992	Satisfied with development of democracy in 1998
Bulgaria	62	52	39	21
Czech Republic	61	28	28	33
Estonia	59	55	31	41
Hungary	65	37	30	30
Latvia	57	40	37	24
Lithuania	75	48	52	35
Poland	56	62	27	54
Romania	35	64	41	47
Slovakia (*1993)	51*	35	23*	26
Slovenia (*1993)	61*	42	45*	37

Source: Eurobarometer

Hardly any government has been re-elected in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. Large swings in the composition of parliaments (partly due to majority voting rules) if not in the composition of the popular vote occurred. Sometimes completely new political forces were swept into power such as former King Simeon's movement in Bulgaria. In most cases, the victorious

parties had campaigned on a virtually social-democratic programme, often mixing socialist (i.e. egalitarian, pro-welfare) elements with national ones. Interestingly, social-democratic parties are in many polities not the party with the most egalitarian-minded electorate or membership. While it might be less surprising that post-communist parties are more egalitarian (e.g. the Left Bloc in the Czech Republic or the Bulgarian Socialist Party) it is interesting to see that in some countries it is the right wing, which attracts the egalitarian voters (e.g. Solidarnosc in Poland, the Smallholders Party in Hungary or Meciar's HZDS in Slovakia).^[9]

Whatever voters expected and parties or governments delivered, there has hardly been a promising strategy for achieving prosperity for all in Central and Eastern Europe. Most countries cannot but rely on a form of 'Washington consensus', i.e. tight fiscal and monetary policies, privatisation, attracting foreign investors. The right combination of micro and macro policies could lead to a continuous rise in productivity which allows higher income without jeopardising the external balance and monetary stability. However until now, the record has been mixed and rather disappointing. Though growth rates in the region have generally been higher than the OECD average they are volatile and too low to allow catching-up with Western Europe within a reasonable time span.

All candidate countries chose integration not only in the European economy through association and later accession, but also in the global economy. They accepted the discipline that comes with the membership in the respective organisations (see table 1.3) in order to get market access and become more attractive to foreign investors. Social democrats led or supported these steps. In the end, the countries have become highly integrated in terms of trade and investment, in particular with the EU and, above all, Germany. As always, this 'globalisation' entails costs and benefits that are unequally distributed within the societies. This development will be substantially intensified after accession to the EU (see next section).

Table 1.3: Membership in international organisations (Year of accession)

Country	IMF	World bank	EBRD	OECD	WTO	EFTA*	CEFTA
Estonia	1992	1992	1992		1999	1996	
Latvia	1992	1992	1992		1998/9	1996	
Lithuania	1992	1992	1992		2000	1995	
Poland	1986	before 1989	1990	1996	1995	1993	1993
Czech Rep.	1990/93	1993	1990/93	1995	1995	1992	1993
Slovakia	1990/93	1993	1990/93	2000	1995	1992	1993
Hungary	1982	before 1989	1990	1996	1995	1993	1993
Romania	1972	before 1989	1990		1995	1993	1997
Bulgaria	1990	1991	1990		1996	1993	1998
Slovenia	1993	1993	1992		1995	1995	1996

* no accession, but free trade agreement

Source: Michael Dauderstädt 'Die wirtschaftliche Integration der Beitrittsländer zwischen neuer Abhängigkeit und vorweggenommener Mitgliedschaft' in: Barbara Lippert (ed.) 'Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union – die doppelte Reifeprüfung' Bonn 2000.

All political parties in the transition countries face the dilemma of great expectations and dubious or fragile achievements. In few cases this dilemma could be truly and really solved, at least for some years, by achieving substantial growth and a relatively just distribution of its benefits. But in most countries at most of the time, voters had to live on promises and hopes or, worse, on national or ethnic prejudices and delusions of superiority and grandeur fed by irresponsible politicians. The greatest hope and fattest chance of solving the dilemma, however, still lies with the accession to the EU.

EU accession: hopes, fears, and strategies

Except for a few extremist parties of the right and left, all parties in the accession countries supported EU membership. The application for membership has been filed by the candidate countries under governments of very different political and ideological persuasions (see table 1.4). Basically, the question of EU membership has been an issue of national interest which was not disputed among the major political forces.

Table 1.4: Political forces in government during application for EU membership

Country	Date of application	Ruling Coalition	Political orientation
Bulgaria	14.12.1995	BSP	Left
Czech Republic	17.01.1996	ODS	Centre-right
Estonia	24.11.1995	KMÜ	Centre
Hungary	31.03.1994	MDF + KDNP+FKGP	Centre-right
Latvia	13.10.1995	LC, DPS, LZS	Centre-right
Lithuania	8.12.1995	LDDP	Left
Poland	5.04.1994	SLD+PSL	Left
Romania	22.06.1995	PSDR	Left
Slovakia	27.06.1995	HZDS	Populist
Slovenia	10.06.1996	LDS + SKD	Centre-right

This original consensus was unfortunately based on a very poor knowledge of the EU, its nature, its institutions and its policies. It assumed a beneficial relationship between transition/transformation and integration that would stabilise the young democracies, accelerate economic growth and modernisation and enhance national security. The public shared that view and supported EU membership with overwhelming majorities until 1996 (see table 1.5). The dramatic decline afterwards has a variety of causes, among them probably economic stagnation and a clearer perception of the potential costs of EU accession. In some countries (notably Poland, Slovenia, the Czech

Republic), people think that the EU will benefit from enlargement as much as or more than their own country. Until 2001, when the latest opinion poll by Eurobarometer was published, the public had turned less Eurosceptic, except in Poland. The level of approval is anyway approaching levels of present member states or earlier candidates (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Austria, let alone Norway).

Table 1.5: Popular approval of EU membership

Country/Year	1993	1996	1997	1998	2001
Estonia	79	76	29	35	38
Poland	80	93	70	63	54
Czech republic	84	79	43	49	54
Hungary	83	80	47	56	70
Slovenia	92	79	47	57	56
Latvia	78	80	34	40	46
Lithuania	88	86	35	40	50
Slovakia	84	88	46	62	66
Bulgaria	76	86	49	57	80
Romania	79	97	80	71	85
Average	82,3	84,4	48	53	60

Source: Eurobarometer

Opinion polls (Eurobarometer) in the accession countries show which segments of the societies expect to win and which to lose from accession. On average of all candidate countries, 62% of those polled expected private business to win while only 36% think that farmers and low income groups will be among the winners (34%, respectively 23% expect them to lose). Other sectors thought to benefit were the armed forces and the educational and health systems. In 2001, farmers, the rural population and the elderly figured prominently among those to be expected to lose from accession while large businesses and professionals were seen as winners.

These popular judgements coincide to some extent with economic evaluations on the basis of quantitative models or the experience of earlier enlargements by poorer candidates. In the wake of the first post-communist enlargement of the EU (German unification) inequality has increased between 1993 and 1998 in both parts of Germany, West and East. In the unified country as a whole inequality has declined thanks to the convergence of average eastern and western incomes at the expense of regional equality. Southern enlargement has shown that asset owners are very likely to benefit from additional investment and capital inflows. Wage earners will benefit much less as prices are bound to increase in the Single Market while nominal wage rises are limited by productivity growth. In so far as productivity gains are due to foreign investment, they might be appropriated by those investors rather than by the workers and tax authorities in the candidate host countries. The

most spectacular case of catch-up growth among poor EU member states, Ireland in the 1990s, shows this pattern very clearly: the share of wages has declined substantially and the gross national product is approximately 20% lower than the gross domestic product that includes the income of foreigners originating in Ireland. The country in Central and Eastern Europe that is following the Irish strategy most closely is Hungary, which is showing some of the same effects.

Inequality might not only increase between workers and capital owners but also between poorer and richer regions. The EU has not been very successful in reducing income disparities among regions. Even where income levels converged between member states the variance of regional income levels remained largely constant as disparities within nations increased. EU and national policies could not prevent such an outcome though they might have mitigated it. As, under the conditions of Monetary Union and the Single Market, the economic situation of member states approaches that of regions, this does not bode well for future poor member states.

The probable rise of income disparities in the wake of accession will reinforce the already palpable trend caused by transition and integration. Both developments have affected real wages and boosted some regions, in particular in the western parts of the candidate countries; whilst endangering the growth prospects of the eastern regions neighbouring to countries not likely to join the EU whose borders become tighter controlled. Agriculture is another potential loser of accession, especially in Poland, a prospect that has already created substantial discontent and led to the emergence of an extremist anti-EU party (of Andrzej Lepper) and to a Eurosceptic attitude by the Peasants Party, which was and is the coalition partner of the Polish social democrats. They choose the Peasant Party not so much because as in spite of these tendencies as they hardly had another choice given the peculiarities of the Polish electoral system and the nature and preferences of other potential coalition partners.

In the question of EU accession, many central and crucial issues of post-communist politics will come to a head: the strategy for economic modernisation, the concept of a welfare state, the question of national identity and sovereignty, the challenge of integration and globalisation. The decision will be taken by a referendum in most applicant countries. This will be an opportunity to debate all aspects, but also a challenge to both, proponents and opponents, to legitimate their position. The government that has had the responsibility for the negotiations with the EU will have to justify the concessions it has made and defend the conditions of the accession treaty.

Social democrats have been the strongest advocates of accession in many countries. While parties and groups on the right have shown various degrees and shades of Euroscepticism ranging from outright opposition among the religious right in Poland to the Thatcherite rhetoric of Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic, social democrats have supported the necessary and

often painful adjustments and reforms that have been necessary to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and adopt the *acquis communautaire*. EU negotiators often praised their social democrat counterparts within the accession countries for getting things moving again after a period of stagnation due to conservative foot-dragging and reservations. Why did social democrats support EU membership in spite of the costs and partial drawbacks for their own clientele?

Joining the EU will narrow the range of options among the possible varieties of capitalism to be established in Central and Eastern Europe substantially. That basically is a desirable outcome for social democrats in the applicant countries as the options compatible with EU membership tend to be social-democratic in a wider sense, i.e. they are based on the European 'social model' as expressed and defined by the Treaties of the EU and the *acquis communautaire*, including the European Social Charter and the Charter of Human and Civic Rights. They thus prevent less regulated varieties of capitalism as well as authoritarian models of society. The Copenhagen Criteria require a market economy. The EU Commission has sometimes interpreted and measured the fulfilment of this condition by the level of privatisation. As many social democrats consider privatisation not as an end in itself to be achieved at any price (for example in terms of employment), they sometimes criticised this approach.

The same is basically true regarding national sovereignty. On the one hand, there will be a loss of democratic sovereignty and its transfer to a less democratic Brussels; on the other hand, the risks and the costs of authoritarian and ethnic politics will substantially increase as they would imply the suspension of EU membership. Eventually, EU membership will guarantee unhindered market access to the big EU market, will attract and bring in private capital as well as substantial EU funds, and will give the often small countries an albeit small say in the running of Europe. All this is good news to social democrats in the accession countries. It supports their pro-European strategy which could hardly be changed in favour of a Eurosceptic campaign against membership, given their past investment in that strategy.

The bad news concerns the probable actual effect of accession on prosperity and equality in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As already mentioned above, there is a substantial risk that the overall effect will be one of increasing income disparities within societies and possibly also between countries. This does not preclude a general though unequally distributed rise of income. But even that rise could be unfortunately slowed by some EU policies. EU trade policy will require the new member states to adopt the EU's common customs tariff, which protects agriculture and declining industries (where the EU is weak) rather than modern manufacturing industries. That could induce capital in transition countries to stay or even flow into the more protected sectors where profitability will be comparatively higher. The wel-

come capital inflows could lead to a real appreciation of the national currency and endanger the competitiveness of exports and national production competing with imports. Stricter EU regulation regarding social and environmental standards, though welcome in principle, could overcharge the less productive enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe and undermine their competitiveness. Preparations for the monetary union could fix inflation and exchange rates and thus prevent the necessary nominal catching-up that implies a higher inflation rate in the poorer accession countries or new member states than in the EU average (the so-called 'Balassa-Samuelson effect').

Social democrats in the candidate countries could try to minimise those risks and ask for transitional periods, opt-out clauses and more flexibility in order to preserve their competitive advantages and opportunities for faster growth. Where there is a possible conflict of interest between the accession countries and established EU policies a compromise could be found which protects the interests, in particular of the poor and the workers, on both sides. The negotiating position of the transition countries will become stronger as soon as they are full members. It is only rational for them to try to enter the EU on any possible terms and then to re-negotiate critical points. This will strain however the already cumbersome and fragile European decision-making processes and institutions. As most accession countries are small, they (and thus their social democrats, too) will be interested in European decision-making rules that protect small states against big ones, for instance by giving them disproportionately more Commissioners in the EU Commission or votes in the Council or Parliament. Social democrats, both in the old and new member states, will face these challenges and have to prepare common answers that allow for a democratic shaping of a social Europe.

2

The Western Balkans – Reconciliation

The Western Balkans – Reconciliation

Five of the six countries considered here are former republics of Yugoslavia^[10] and share many common characteristics in terms of party development. We have therefore decided to devote a separate section to Albania in order to treat the special circumstance of this country fairly. Our excluding the question of parties in Kosovo should not be interpreted as taking a position on the future status of Kosovo, but is rather a reflection of the reality of the low level of party development. Kosovo's first democratic elections were only held in 2001 after all. The sixth republic of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, which is a candidate for European Union (EU) accession in 2004, has been covered in the section above.

A survey of social-democratic parties

The social-democratic parties of the region are set out in Table 2.1 (below). In five out of the six countries the Socialist International currently has a member party and the majority of these are successor parties to or are the reformed wings of the communist parties. Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe there are no re-founded 'historic' social-democratic parties.

In Serbia the party system is only just beginning to develop beyond the structures set up to oppose the Milošević regime and there are still a number of parties that identify themselves as social-democratic, two of whom have recently applied for membership of the SI.

Table 2.1: Social-democratic parties in South-East Europe

Country	Party	Historical Background	SI Status	Strength
Albania	PSSH	Reformed former communists	Consultative	Strong
	PSDSH	New	Full	Weak
Bosnia and Herzegovina	SDP	Reformed former communists	Full	Strong
	SNSD	New	Observer	Medium
Croatia	SDP	Reformed former communists	Full	Strong
Macedonia	SDSM	Reformed former communists	Observer	Strong
Montenegro	DPS	Reformed former communists	None	Strong
	SDP	New	Consultative	Weak
Serbia	Several		None	Weak

The development of social-democratic parties in the former Yugoslavia has been influenced by four factors:

- 1 their heritage of communist 'Yugoslavism';
- 2 the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the need to resolve the national question;
- 3 the growing importance of social and economic reconstruction after the devastation of war;
- 4 and finally, the promotion of social-democratic parties in the region by the International Community as an alternative to nationalist parties and the long-term goal of accession to the EU.

The legacy of Yugoslavia

Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the collapse of communism in the former Yugoslavia was not a result of an anti-communist revolution but rather of national disintegration. There were no major anti-communist movements or demonstrations as in Poland or Czechoslovakia. Rather, by 1990 the Yugoslav federation was incapable of meeting the challenges thrown up by the economic and social decline the country had undergone over the preceding ten years. Federalism and the rotating Presidency introduced after the death of Tito in 1980 led to political and economic inertia and the resulting political vacuum was filled by nationalism.

The politics of the first Yugoslavia had centred on a dispute between Serbs and Croats over the nature of the country's very identity. Yugoslav politics from 1945-80, the year of Tito's death, was defined by a constant desire to achieve checks and balances in every aspect of society between the constituent republics. The dispute between Serbia and Croatia would no longer be allowed to dominate; Croatian nationalism was perceived as separatist, Serbian nationalism as hegemonic. Bosnia and Montenegro were granted republic status in recognition of their strong partisan tradition in the Second World War. A distinct Macedonian identity (as opposed to competing claims over whether Macedonia and its inhabitants were actually Bulgarian or Serbian) was nurtured for the first time. The constitution was rewritten on several occasions to this end, each version moving towards a more confederal state, the last revision in 1974 recognising the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. A purge against liberals or nationalists in one republic would require an equal purge in the others. The second Yugoslavia could only be held together by the promotion of socialist 'brotherhood and unity'.

Yugoslav communism distinguished itself from the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe both in the way in which it had been established and by its distinctive national course. Communism in Yugoslavia was not imposed by the Soviet Red Army but was established following liberation from Nazi occupation and the Ustasa regime in Croatia by the communist-led partisans. It claimed, therefore, a degree of legitimacy and the non-nationalist partisan Yugoslav tradition was promoted as an alternative ideology to

the competing (Serbian and Croatian) nationalisms that had led to the royal dictatorship in 1929 and which had manifested themselves so brutally during the Second World War. The subsequent split with Stalin and the Cominform in 1948 and the promotion of the dual policies of non-alignment and self-management gave Yugoslavia an identity distinct from its fellow communist neighbours. By the late 1960s Yugoslavs were free to travel and work abroad and had frequent contact with West Europeans through tourism and labour migration. The Yugoslav economy grew throughout these years thanks to western credits and Yugoslavs enjoyed a higher standard of living than other citizens of Eastern Europe.

The beginning of the end

The structure of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) mirrored the federal structure of the state. Each republic had its own party organisation and the federal character of the party only served to strengthen the pace of national disintegration as the republican party leaderships sought to defend the interests of their own republics. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia this meant increasing demands for independence. In Serbia these were met with counter demands to protect the 'interests' of Serbs wherever they lived in Yugoslavia, not just within the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia. Bosnia and Macedonia, aware of the threat to their own survival, tried to keep the federation together by promoting a looser federal structure. The culmination of this debate was the walkout by the Slovenian and Croatian delegations from the fourteenth Congress of the SKJ in January 1990, which marked the end of the federal party and effectively of the federal state. One of the last acts of the 14th Congress of the SKJ had been to accept political pluralism. Yet the subsequent elections were held at republican, not federal level, thus hastening the process of national disintegration.

Independent political parties had begun to develop in Slovenia and Croatia before the 14th Congress, however, the process gathered pace as a result of the republican elections that took place during 1990. From Slovenia to Macedonia independent political parties demanded not only democracy and economic reform, but either an end to or a fundamental restructuring of the federal character of Yugoslavia. The national question was more important than democratisation and an end to communism.

Only one pan-Yugoslav party was set up at this time, the Alliance of Reformed Forces in 1990, led by the Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic. It was to have only small electoral successes in Bosnia and Macedonia, but many former members were later to re-emerge in the new social-democratic parties.

The republican communist parties adopted differing strategies in response to the process of national disintegration. All changed their names, either adopting transitional labels such as the 'League of Communists - Party of Democratic Change' as in Croatia and Macedonia, or new names altogether

such as the Socialist Party of Serbia. They also, as has been mentioned above, took differing stands on the future of Yugoslavia. However, as successors to the SKJ they were clearly identified with Tito and 'Yugoslavisim'. This would prevent many of the new parties from playing a defining role in the early years of the new independent states.

Nationalist parties won the first democratic elections in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Macedonia the reformed communists won only 18% of the vote but were able to construct a coalition government when their leader Kiro Gligorov was elected president. In Serbia the SPS and in Montenegro DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists) won. Although they had fought these elections against Serbian nationalist parties it can be argued that both the SPS and DPS had also adopted the rhetoric of Serbian nationalism.

War and national consolidation

By 1991-1992 disintegration had been replaced by war. The political systems of the emerging democracies were forged by war, and the logic of war required strong leadership. The new states adopted presidential as opposed to parliamentary constitutions, and majoritarian as opposed to proportional electoral systems. As a consequence they came to be dominated by single parties (in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina each nationality by a single nationalist party) which were essentially presidential parties, created by and for the personal advancement of their war-time leaders and their accompanying cliques.

The new states had the formal attributes of democracy; regular parliamentary and presidential elections (with the obvious exception of war-torn Bosnia), constitutional separation of powers and independent political parties – they also had aspects of authoritarianism; government control over the media, manipulation of electoral results and the occasional arrest of opposition activists. As in many transition countries there was a very low level of political understanding by the population as a whole. Voters were thus subject to the manipulation and invocation of (nationalist) symbols and myths rather than by competing values or ideologies. Social democrats found little fertile ground for their ideas in such conditions.

Politics in Croatia from 1990-1995 was defined by the need to secure the republic's territory and boundaries. Although the country's independence was recognised by the International Community in 1992, until 1995 25% of Croatia's territory^[11] was controlled by Croatian Serbs seeking union with Serbia, a situation which only ended after 'Operation Storm' in August that year. The reformed communists, now renamed as the Social Democracy of Croatia (SDH) won only 5% of the vote in the 1992 elections. Their support in 1990 had been distorted by the high number of Croatian Serbs who voted for the party fearing the rise of the nationalist HDZ. After the electoral victory of the HDZ Croatian Serbs, especially those outside Zagreb, deserted the party en masse for the Serb Democratic Party (SDS).

In 1994 the SDH merged with the social-democratic Party of Croatia

(SDSH) to become the social-democratic Party (SDP). Whilst the social democrats opposed Tudjman's intervention in the Bosnian war and the creation of a separate Bosnian Croat state, along with all other Croatian parties they supported the aim of extending the Croatian government's control over the republic's territory and have continued to deny allegations of ethnic cleansing during Operation Storm. In the elections following Operation Storm in the autumn of 1995 the SDP won 9% of the vote but emerged as the largest opposition party in the capital, Zagreb. Although hardly a major victory, many commentators had written the SDP off before the elections and the result indicated the growing importance of economic policy after the 'resolution' of the statehood question.

Robert Thomas^[12] argues that Serbian politics at the time can be understood by a division between two camps, the national romantics (anti-communist but also Serb nationalist and traditionalist) and the rationalists (non-nationalists, modernisers, but not necessarily communist). In Serbia the SPS adopted a twin-track strategy portraying itself as both a defender of Serbian national interests and at the same time seeking to portray itself as a modern European socialist party. Part of the success of the SPS during the 1990s was its ability to represent both the national romantic and rationalist camps and to switch between the two whenever it was convenient to do so. This also partly explains why, despite the emergence of several parties labelling themselves as social democrats during the 1990s, a viable social-democratic alternative to the SPS was unable to emerge until the fall of the Milošević regime.

The opposition to the SPS in the early years was led by the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic Party, both of which took a strong nationalist line. However, during 1992 several smaller non-nationalist parties were formed in Serbia. The Civic Alliance (GSS) brought together four small groups, many former Alliance of Reformed Forces members and also including the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, although the League soon split away again. In June 1992 a social-democratic faction broke away from the SPS^[13] and joined the short-lived Democratic Coalition of opposition parties formed to fight the parliamentary elections of December 1992. However, the Coalition soon fell apart, divided between the national romantic and rationalist wings of the opposition.

The social democrats who had left the SPS in 1992 merged with New Democracy in 1994. New Democracy had been set up in June 1990 by the youth wing of the League of Communists. Following new elections in December 1993 the SPS remained the largest party but did not have an overall majority in parliament, and in February 1994 New Democracy joined the SPS in a coalition government. At its third Congress in 1996, following the Dayton Accords, the SPS purged many of its nationalist members from leading positions, promoting itself as a mainstream party and seeking contacts with western social democrats.

Also in 1996 a split took place in the Civic Alliance. Zarko Korac, a GSS

vice-president led the break away faction and founded the social-democratic Union which he said, 'would understand the left in the way it is understood in Western Europe today'.^[14] The SPS again won the parliamentary elections at the end of 1996, but the opposition, this time united as the Zajedno coalition made major gains in the local elections. At first Milošević refused to recognise the results but after a long campaign of street demonstrations and the intervention of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) he was forced to do so. As a consequence the nationalist wing of the SPS was strengthened, and the Zajedno coalition soon fell apart.

Macedonia, under the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was not to win international recognition until April 1993. It was caught between UN imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and a Greek border blockade. The reformed Communists had renamed themselves the social-democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) in 1991. Their candidate, Kiro Gligorov, easily won the presidential elections in 1994. For the parliamentary elections of the same year the SDSM campaigned as part of the 'Alliance for Macedonia' coalition with the Liberals and Socialists (i.e. the unreformed wing of the former League of Communists) which won 32% of the votes in the first round of voting. However, the nationalist VMRO boycotted the second round in protest against the electoral procedure which the OSCE characterised as flawed, although more as a result of incompetence rather than fraud. The SDSM concentrated on a policy of national consolidation, seeking FYROM's integration into international organisations. Progress on economic and social policy proved impossible whilst the country was effectively blockaded from both north and south. FYROM was slowly admitted into international institutions, entering the OSCE and Council of Europe in 1995. In the same year the Greeks ended their blockade of the border and the UN lifted sanctions against Yugoslavia.

In Montenegro the communists renamed themselves the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) but remained under the control of Milošević and Belgrade. The social-democratic Party was formed in June 1993. It was opposed to the wars and campaigned for greater independence for Montenegro within the third Yugoslavia (created by Serbia and Montenegro in 1992).

'It's the economy, stupid'

The wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina came to an end during 1995. The popular expectation was that now that the new nations had been finally established in secure borders the governments would turn their attention to the process of economic reconstruction and transition. They were to be sorely disappointed. Although some privatisation and economic reform did take place, the regimes that had secured power during the wars were more interested in securing their personal enrichment. The subsequent public disillusionment was to give the region's social democrats, marginalised during the wars, the possibility to return to prominence.

Croatia at the end of the war in 1995 was in a state of economic collapse. Tourism, its largest industry was at 10% of its 1990 figure, the official unemployment rate was 20%. Rijeka, Croatia's largest port had carried 12 million tons of traffic in 1990, in 1997 it only carried 2 million.^[15] It was against this background of economic crisis that the SDP began to make gains. In the April 1997 local elections they won 16.5% of the vote, nearly doubling their 1995 score. In the elections for the upper house of parliament they increased their number of seats from one to four and their presidential candidate won 21%, coming second behind president Tudjman.

By August 1998 the SDP was scoring approximately 20% in the opinion polls. The failure of the HDZ regime to tackle the economy worked to the SDP's advantage as it focused on social and economic issues. However, the SDP still felt that its communist (and hence Yugoslav) past was a serious barrier to further progress. It thus sought closer co-operation with the opposition Social Liberals (HSLs) led by the veteran Croatian nationalist Drazen Budisa. In August 1999 the two parties announced a coalition, breaking with the former six party opposition coalition. Tudjman died at the end of 1999, his party, the HDZ, was racked by factionalism and infighting over his succession and was weakened by corruption scandals and the failure to tackle the country's economic crisis. In 1999 Croatia recorded negative economic growth, the unemployment rate was 20% and the average monthly income was only 500 euro. In the elections on 3rd January 2000 the SDP-HSLs coalition won in nine out of ten electoral districts and took 38.7% of the vote resulting in SDP leader Ivica Račan becoming prime minister.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) the first post-war, post-Dayton Agreement elections were held in September 1996. In the Federation two social-democratic parties fought the elections; the SDP BiH, which was the successor to the reformed communists, and Social Democracy (SD BiH), which had emerged from the youth wing of the League of Communists. Both had served in the Bosnian government during the war and had tried to defend the multi-ethnic character of the state. In the Republika Srpska (RS) the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) was founded in March 1996 by independent members of the RS National Assembly. However, the nationalist parties from all three communities won an overwhelming majority of votes. The split in the Serb nationalist camp in 1997 saw the appointment of SNSD leader Milorad Dodik as prime minister of the RS in January 1998. Dodik had been a communist-era Mayor, who was elected a Member of Bosnian parliament for the pro-Yugoslav Alliance of Reformed Forces in 1990. Throughout the war he maintained contacts with Bosniaks in the SD BiH in Tuzla.^[16] In the September 1998 elections both Federation social-democratic parties scored almost exactly the same results as they had in 1996 but Dodik continued as prime minister at the head of the Sloga coalition. However, the three nationalist parties continued to block any significant progress on the implementation of Dayton, especially refugee return.

By 2000 Bosnia-Herzegovina had hardly progressed in either the implementation of Dayton or in economic development. Economic growth was only as a result of investment by the International Community, and by 2000 this was beginning to decline. Unemployment officially stood at 40%, although there was a substantial grey economy. The average monthly income was 150 euro.^[17] The International Community was growing increasingly frustrated by the intransigence of the nationalist parties and began a major public campaign against corruption, almost explicitly pointing the finger at the parties in power.

Against this economic crisis the social democrats in both the Federation and the RS made a breakthrough in the local elections of April 2000. The SDP BiH and SD had merged in February 1999 under pressure from West European social democrats and the new SDP was admitted to the SI in November that year. In the Federation the SDP became the single largest party in the local elections. The Croatian elections of January 2000 had had some influence. Bosniak voters felt that it was now safe to move away from the nationalist SDA, Croatian voters in Bosnia, however, still voted overwhelmingly for the nationalist HDZ.

These results were repeated in the parliamentary elections in November 2000. The SDP, as the largest party, went on to lead the 'Alliance for Change' coalition governments at both BiH and Federation level. Whilst the SNSD went into opposition in the RS, it supported the Alliance for Change at BiH level. Amongst Bosnian Serbs and Croats, however, the nationalist parties still won the largest percentage of votes – 80% of Bosnian Croats voted for the HDZ.

In Serbia defeat in Kosovo in 1999 did not lead to the immediate collapse of the Milošević regime, but the country's international isolation and economic impoverishment finally succeeded in uniting the Serbian opposition behind a single candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, who stood against Milošević in the September 2000 presidential elections. Milošević and the SPS held onto power until the 'revolution' of 5th October 2000. They had done so because of their total use and abuse of the Serbian state through patronage, control over the media and the economy. Unlike the other reformed republican communist parties the SPS had been unwilling to transform itself into a social-democratic party, but it was able to occupy the political space on the left and prevented opposition social democrats from creating a viable alternative to it.

The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) which finally overthrew Milošević contained sixteen political parties. Four of these contained the words 'social-democratic' in their titles, another four had political programmes that could be described as broadly social-democratic. In April 2002, two of these, the SDU and Social Democracy merged to form the social-democratic Party (SDP). The SDP and the Democratic Party of prime minister Djindjic, both applied for membership of the SI in May 2002.

In Montenegro, anti-Milošević members of the ruling DPS staged an

internal party coup in July 1997. Momir Bulatović, the party leader, was ousted by Milo Djukanović who had established links with the Serbian opposition and who supported the economic reform programme of the G17 think tank. G17 has been set up by opposition activists to develop an alternative economic policy to Milošević. Many of its founders now play key roles in DOS and the Federal and Serbian governments. Djukanović also sought to reach out to the Albanian and Muslim minorities in Montenegro and advocated links with the West. In the presidential elections of October 1997 Djukanović beat Bulatović by just 5000 votes. In 1998 the DPS and SDP formed the 'For a Better Life' coalition which won the parliamentary elections. As conflict over Kosovo loomed Djukanović was actively courted by the International Community and Montenegro opposed Serbian actions in Kosovo during the war in 1999. The DPS-SDP coalition moved towards support for Montenegrin independence and rumours were rife during 1999 and 2000 of armed intervention by Milošević and the Yugoslav army against Djukanović. Gambling on yet another Milošević victory in the Yugoslav Federal elections of September 2000 Djukanović and the DPS-SDP coalition boycotted the elections and failed to support the Serbian opposition. Support from the International Community for an independent line by Montenegro ended after the Serbian 'revolution' of 5th October 2000 and the election of the DOS government as concern over the region's stability grew.

The consolidation of the state in Macedonia and the growth in importance of social and economic questions had the opposite effect than that experienced in the other republics of the former Yugoslavia. Although the Social Democrat led government had normalised relations with Greece and Yugoslavia and secured macroeconomic stabilisation, unemployment stood at 30% in 1998 and the average monthly income was 200 euro.^[18] In the parliamentary elections of 1998 the nationalist VMRO came to power. President Gligorov failed to endorse the SDSM in the run-up to the elections which saw the SDSM being punished for perceived nepotism and clientelism. In the 1999 presidential elections the SDSM candidate won 33% of the vote in the first round and lost in the second round to the candidate of the conservative government. The 1998 elections had seen the Macedonian nationalist VMRO go into coalition with the Albanian nationalist DPA. In the 1999 presidential campaign the SDSM sought to play on anti-Albanian sentiment. The SDSM candidate Tito Petkovski accused the VMRO as those 'who sold their country and identity to the Albanians in an effort to stay in power'.^[19] Needless to say the SDSM only secured 4% of the Albanian vote in 1999.

The outbreak of serious ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001, however, saw the SDSM take a much more constructive line. They supported the position of the International Community and the intervention of the NATO peace-keeping force. They entered the government of National Unity and worked hard to implement the details of the Ohrid Agreements. With the prospect of elections at the end of 2002 they withdrew from the National Unity govern-

ment but continued to criticise the nationalist positions of the governing VMRO.

A factor for regional stability

A common factor united the social-democratic parties of the former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the twenty-first century; they had been identified by the International Community as potential factors for stability for the region in contrast to the nationalist parties that had governed in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia until 2000. As such they have received support not only from western social-democratic parties in terms of training and campaign advice but their leaders have been courted and promoted by regular contacts with leading politicians from NATO, the EU and other pillars of the International Community. This message was reinforced in other ways, as can be seen by the OSCE anti-corruption campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2000. The same process could be observed in Macedonia during the ethnic conflict in 2001 when the SDSM were brought back into a government of National Unity to secure support for the 'Ohrid Agreements' which were negotiated under supervision of the international community during the summer of 2001 by all Macedonian political parties, representing both Macedonians and Albanians, to bring an end to armed conflict.

Since October 2000, however, the International Community's relations with the DPS-SDP government in Montenegro have cooled as the coalition has pushed for greater Montenegrin independence from Yugoslavia. This is perceived by many, especially the European Union, as potentially destabilising because of the possible knock-on effects in Kosovo or even the Republika Srpska. The agreement on a loose federation of Serbia and Montenegro, agreed by the leaders of the two republics in March 2002 under the auspices of the EU's High Representative Javier Solana, has weakened the Djukanović government and strengthened the hands of the opposition which includes many former supporters of the Milošević regime.

Albania

Albania's transition from communism began in the mid-1980s with the gradual re-emergence of the country from 30 years of international isolation following the death of Enver Hoxha. Frustration at the slow pace of reform led to widespread strikes in early 1990 which were followed by student demonstrations in the autumn of the same year calling for multi-party elections. Under growing pressure the Central Committee of the Communist Party agreed to legalise independent parties in December 1990.

Multi-party elections were held in March 1991 and the communists won 169 of the 250 seats, losing the urban centres to the newly created opposition parties but winning the overall support of the conservative rural population. However, growing public protest organised by the opposition led the short-

lived communist government to resign and in June 1991 a government of 'National Stability' was formed in which the communists held twelve seats; the Democrats seven; and minor parties, including the newly formed Social Democrats, a small party of urban intellectuals, five.

The Communist Party congress in June 1991 changed the name of the party to the Socialist Party of Albania, adopting fundamental changes to the party's statutes and ideology. The party, led by Fatos Nano, committed itself to democracy, social justice and economic reform. In December 1991 the Democratic Party withdrew from the coalition and new elections were held in March 1992 which were convincingly won by the Democrats.

The Democrats were unable, however, to provide stability or reform. As the economy collapsed and large numbers sought economic prosperity abroad they resorted to authoritarian rule and manipulation of elections. Following the collapse of pyramid-investment schemes in early 1997 the country descended into rebellion. The Socialist Party provided the only element of stability (at their 1996 congress they removed all references to Marxism from the party's statutes and programme), and backed by an international peace-keeping force, formed a new National Unity government. The socialists, and their allies including the social democrats, returned to power in elections in June 1997.

Fatos Nano became prime minister, but was forced to resign in 1998 following unrest in the country after the shooting of an opposition politician. He was succeeded by Pandeli Majko, one of a number of young leaders from the party's youth section who had developed close links with Western social democrats. Majko led the country through the difficult period of the Kosovo conflict, and won much international respect. However, Nano challenged Majko for the party leadership at the 1999 Congress and won and Majko resigned as prime minister. Another young reformer Ilir Meta, leader of the youth section, succeeded him, however. He continued the policy of social and economic reform and co-operation with the European Union and NATO. He led the party to electoral victory in 2001 but the division between the reform and conservative camps deepened and in January 2002 Meta resigned as prime minister following an internal party campaign against him led by Nano. Nano, who had set his sights on the post of president, failed to get his candidate for prime minister endorsed by the party, losing to Pandeli Majko for the reformers. Meta announced he would mobilise a campaign inside the party for reform, whilst Majko sought to stabilise the government by building bridges between the factions. In July 2002, following the election of an independent candidate for president of the country, Nano returned to the position of prime minister with both Meta and Majko serving as high-ranking ministers in his cabinet. The social democrats withdrew their support from the government in protest at Nano's return. The future direction of the Socialist Party is, therefore, far from clear.

The left has played a key role in Albania's stabilisation, its transition to

democracy and in beginning the development of a market economy. The European Union has recently announced its intention to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association agreement with the country. However, the high degree of factionalism within the Socialist Party has threatened this stability on several occasions already and may yet play a decisive role in the country's future transition.

Regional integration and the prospect of EU accession

The end of the war in Kosovo in June 1999 led the International Community to adopt a coherent regional approach to the western Balkans for the first time since the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991-2. The Cologne European Council in June 1999 proposed the creation of a Stability Pact for South-East Europe which was formally set up in Sarajevo in July 1999. Bringing together not only the EU and USA but international bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF, the Stability Pact sought to bring an end to almost a decade of war through economic reconstruction and regional integration.

The European Union launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in November 2000 in Zagreb at a Summit of Heads of State and Government of the EU and the countries of the region. Social democrats participated in government in five out of six countries from the region, with the exception of Macedonia. The identification by the International Community of social-democratic parties as being factors for stability seemed to have been justified.

Based on the Europe Agreements and the experience of the enlargement process with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Stabilisation and Association process is designed to equip the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania with the administrative and legal capacities to begin the process of applying for EU membership and adoption of the '*acquis communautaire*'. The process is both bilateral and regional. It entails a contractual relationship between the EU and individual states on the implementation of reform, but it also requires a commitment to regional integration between the countries of South-East Europe. SAP agreements have so far been signed with Macedonia and Croatia and a negotiating mandate for the European Commission has been agreed in relation to Albania. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the European Union concentrated its efforts in late 2001-early 2002 on securing the continued union, in a looser but still federal form, between Serbia and Montenegro. Bosnia and Herzegovina is still some way from negotiations beginning on the process. The European Union has spent 5 billion euro in the region since 1991 on humanitarian and other assistance, under the SAP it has committed itself to spend nearly 5 billion euro more until 2006.^[20]

This would imply major economic and social reform in each of the countries and the intensification of the process of transition which had only really begun with the ending of the nationalist regimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. The social-democratic parties of the region had grown rapidly in the late 1990s on the back of a wave of public discontent at the failure of nationalism

to bring economic benefits. They would now, as the strongest advocates of European integration as an alternative to nationalist isolation, be clearly identified with the social and economic consequences of transition.

The ability of social democrats from the region to manage this transition and to remain electorally popular is as yet unclear. However, a series of opinion polls conducted in early 2002 throughout the region showed that whilst the population of South-East Europe are frustrated at the slow pace of economic reform, they accept that there is no alternative and that the region's future lies in the process of European integration.

Table 2.2: Economic expectations

Country	Better	Same	Worse	Don't Know
Bosnia - Fed	49%	17%	9%	25%
Bosnia - RS	42%	14%	20%	26%
Croatia	55%	23%	9.5%	12.5%
Macedonia	52%	24%	18.6%	5.6%
Montenegro	52%	9%	12%	27%
Serbia	68%	12%	10%	10%

*Question: What do you expect your personal economic situation to be in 5 years time?

Source: International IDEA, New Means for Regional Analysis, March 2002

Table 2.3: Major concerns

Country	Unemployment	Corruption	Ethnic Conflict
Bosnia - Fed	77.7%	48%	7.5%
Bosnia - RS	55%	54.7%	13.6%
Croatia	72.3%	34%	1.3%
Macedonia	69.6%	40%	31.7%
Montenegro	43.8%	46.5%	8.2%
Serbia	48.1%	37.3%	7.8%

*Question: What is the biggest problem facing your country?

Source: International IDEA, New Means for Regional Analysis, March 2002

Table 2.4: Evaluation of economic transition

Country	Too fast	Too slow	About right	Don't know
Bosnia - Fed	11%	50%	15%	24%
Bosnia - RS	8%	53%	12%	27%
Croatia	18%	32%	26%	23%
Macedonia	23%	56%	17%	4%
Montenegro	8%	35%	24.5%	32%
Serbia	24%	32%	26.5%	17%

*Question: What do you feel about the pace of economic transition in your country?

Source: International IDEA, New Means for Regional Analysis, March 2002

Social democrats have been able to emerge as major players in the majority of countries in the region because they have focused on the issues that, once the questions of nationality and statehood had been resolved, matter most to the population, namely social and economic security. They have been helped along the way by active support from the International Community which perceived them as factors for stability. Conservative parties on the other hand, have until now, been primarily driven by a nationalist as opposed to an economic reform agenda. If the transition process falters, or does not proceed fast enough to satisfy rising public expectations, they may be able to regain their political fortunes. Social democrats in South-East Europe should, therefore, seek to ensure the success of the Stabilisation and Association Process but they should be careful to avoid promising early or rapid accession to the European Union. Failure to deliver may re-awaken the nationalist demons that blighted the region in the early 1990s.

3

The Former Soviet Union – Stagnation

The former Soviet Union – Stagnation

At first glance, it is surprising: the lack of a social-democratic movement of substance in almost all of the countries of the former Soviet Union. Social democracy could offer the rational, centre-left alternative to the old-style Soviet command economy and party dictatorship on the one hand, and the 'Wild East' type of economic change and social misery which post-communism has produced on the other. It did not materialise. Irrespective of the stubborn orthodoxy of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the ostentatious lack of interest, which the new political and economic elites have shown for the interests of the common people, social democracy seems marginal and irrelevant. Why is social democracy a major political current in most of the Central European countries and yet never took root in the lands of the old Soviet Empire?

There are no simple answers to these questions. The post-Soviet countries are a motley collection: from the relatively stable democracies in the Baltic area, through repressive political dictatorships in Belarus and, although differently shaped, in Ukraine and Moldova; to strongly repressive, sometimes religiously inspired and family clique kind of dictatorships in Central Asia. And there is the Russian Federation – a world apart, or so it seems, with its own political laws (or the lack thereof), highly unpredictable, unstructured and strongly 'personalised'.

Table 3.1: SI-linked parties in the CIS

Country	Parties	SI Status	Performance
Armenia	ARF Armenian Socialist Party	Consultative	Weak
Azerbaijan	Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, SDPA	Observer	Very weak
Belarus	Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Narodnaya Hramada), BSDP	Observer	Very weak
Georgia	Citizens' Union of Georgia, CUG	Observer	Relatively strong
Moldova	Social Democratic Party of Moldova	Observer	Very weak

The condition of social democrats in the countries of the former Soviet Union is not equally bleak everywhere. We have covered the Baltic countries above. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania harbour parties which identify themselves as social-democratic, and which are generally taken seriously by the Socialist International. Other parties with some amount of socialist international recognition include the mostly weak social-democratic and socialist parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova.

There is no 'historical' social democracy in Russia. All parties were newly established. The legacy of the totalitarian past proved to be too devastating to tie in with the pre-revolutionary experience. The Menshevik Party, the moderate wing of the early twentieth century workers movement in Russia, has not been re-established. There were no activists left. There was no social memory. The party had been outlawed and its 'memory' repressed for almost seven decades. Very few Russians, if any, still had personal recollections about social democracy, and if they had, they were most probably negative. Social democracy has been officially de-legitimised for generations. If it was not a variant of fascism, as Stalin ordered it at the end of the 1920's, it remained a highly dubious, treacherous and hostile political orientation, more dangerous actually than openly bourgeois parties. Only Gorbachev proved willing to bridge the gap. While in power, he never accepted social democracy as a label for his own policies, but he got closer, the more obstacles his reformist strategy met. Today, he is Russia's most well known social democrat. When asked why a seventy-year old man, who has experienced everything a politician might possibly dream of, would want to throw himself into another political adventure, he gave a simple and straight answer: to finish *perestroika*. Only a strong social-democratic party in Russia would complete the process of change, which he had initiated in 1985.^[21] The absence of social democracy in the Russian Federation is not exceptional. In general, the duration and the profundity of the communist order have prevented any historical party from re-appearing at the political stage: no Mensheviks, no Cadets (liberals), no Socialist-Revolutionaries. Paradoxically, only Bolshevism survived seventy years of communist dictatorship, although only marginally so. The lack of historical parties not only relates to Russia. It is observable in the whole former Soviet Union, including such states as Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan, which had a rather strong pre-revolutionary social-democratic tradition.

Getting pink in Russia

The social-democratic landscape in East-Central Europe shows more successful successor-parties than historical parties. The Czech Republic is the main exception. The Communist Party never shook off its orthodox ideological feathers, which allowed the 'old' social democrats to acquire their own niche in the Czech polity. The Czech Republic has its strong historical social-democratic party; Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania know ruling successor-parties; Russia has neither of the two. The 'social democratisation' of the communist party, or *porozoveniye*, 'getting pink' in Russian, has not occurred in Russia yet. Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, relatively orthodox communism is still among the major political sentiments and organisations. As ideologically confused, personally divided, organisationally crippled and politically marginalised the KPRF may seem, it is still the only serious 'left-wing' party in Russia (although, as stated above, left and right have largely lost their distinguishing relevance).

The KPRF is a bundle of contradictions. It presents itself as an anti-systemic political party, seeking an alternative to liberal democracy and capitalism, while it has reached a high level of integration with the current political regime. The party still accepts the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, but it is also one of the major 'nationalistic' forces in Russia, for which the interests of the Russian state and nation are no longer primarily defined by the ideas of socialist ideologues from earlier centuries. The KPRF has always been strongly divided over ideology and tactics. It tends to reserve the communist idea for its core membership, and a more statist-patriotic message for the wider audience.^[22]

There are reasons to believe that the decline of the role of the KPRF in Russian politics is only a matter of time. Its constituency is ageing; its public support is (slowly) declining. It will be increasingly difficult to uphold its anti-systemic profile, and to sustain the attractiveness of its non-nationalistic ideological nucleus, Marxism-Leninism. Whether or not the political void which it will inevitably leave, will be filled by 'social democracy' remains to be seen. Despite the presence of some social-democratically oriented elements within its rank-and-file, a successful 'social democratisation' of the communist party still seems very far away. It demands not only a drastic turnover of leadership, crucially important in itself, but also a complete overhaul of its ideological premises and political preferences.

The social-democratic parties that post-communist Russia has known so far, were all newly-established, sometimes by former communists, sometimes by members of the opposition. All parties remained numerically small and electoral insignificant. The social-democratic movement has been constantly plagued by clashing ego's and other personal conflicts, by splits and laborious processes of unification, by low budgets, poor election campaigns and, most importantly, by a deafening lack of interest on the part of the political elite and the society at large. Social democracy remained a toy of mostly isolated political activists and intellectuals of good will and a few frustrated adventurers looking for new vehicles to enter the world of power and privileges (again). Stagnation seems the apt description here.

The first initiatives to establish a social-democratic movement of sorts were taken during the early stages of *perestroika*. The first party of some relevance appeared only in the spring of 1990: the social-democratic Party of Russia (SDPR). The initiators rejected Marxism, and focussed, as they asserted, on the Austrian model. A new shoot joined the family in 1991: the Socialist Party of Workers or SPT (a small offspring from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Both the SDPR and the SPT had two deputies in the Duma (1993-1995); the SPT had an additional member in the Federation Council. Their electoral performance would never be improved. Various self-styled social democrats made it to the Russian parliament, but always as individuals or on the list of other parties. No single social-democratic party has ever passed the Duma threshold.^[23]

As yet, the probably most important initiative taken was the establishment of the United social-democratic Party (USDP) in March 2000, under the leadership of Gorbachev. Despite the fact that Gorbachev probably has more political authority and organisational capacity than all of the other social-democratic foremen combined, he is still very unpopular in Russia, and so is most he politically stood for in the final years of the Soviet Union. The establishment of the party was his personal move, as Boris Guseletov, political secretary of the USDP, asserts. It was meant to bypass all those ego's, who had always stood in the way of meaningful party-building and coalition.^[24] At its founding congress, on July 8, 2000, the party presented itself as the 'dignified alternative' to communism. It stood for a 'third way', a popular slogan among some West European social democrats at that time, between 'communist utopianism' and 'neo-liberal fundamentalism'. The USDP programme reflects the rather eclectic nature of the party's potential following.^[25] It presents the 'family' as the most important institution in society's development. It promises to pay special attention to the 'largest group of citizens in Russia', women. Indeed, women are prominently present among those middle-groups where the party expects to find its main following: people in education, in health-care, and in the middle echelons of private enterprise and the government bureaucracy.^[26] 'Our party is a social-democratic party after the European model', as Guseletov opines.

'In Russia social democracy will never take root', Nicolai Shmelov from the Europe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences recently lamented. 'The Russians are willing to believe in all and sundry, but not in the ideal of social democracy, that is in common sense and the middle course. It seems easier for them to accept communist chimera's, nationalistic nonsense, the hair-brained schemes of the "MMM" pyramid or the idea that one would be able to exchange Anatoly Chubias' privatisation vouchers for two Volga cars, than to trust something which has been tested world-wide and which has proved to work. Why? Only God knows.'^[27] Empirical observation shows that modern social democracy (as much as most other democratic political parties) in order to function properly needs a democratic political infrastructure, a more or less developed market economy and a considerable civil society. social-democratic re-distributive policies have worked best (if not exclusively) in relatively highly developed, well-organised societies, with rather sharply defined social groups and interests. Social democracy essentially is a West European phenomenon. None of the three 'preconditions' of social democracy are present in the Russian Federation or in the other former Soviet republics today.

The link between parties, their programmes and values on the one hand and the societal interests they ideally articulate and represent on the other, is generally weak in Russia, a country which went through a deep and dramatic process of change. Post-communist society is a strongly divided, but still a rather amorphous whole of a small, powerful, and sometimes extra-

vagantly rich upper layer of *novye russkiye* or new Russians, a small and fragile middle-class, and a hardly differentiated, but overwhelmingly poor bulk of the people. Society's middle groups, among whom social democracy has to recruit its followers, is only slowly developing, and the rouble crisis of August 1998 reminds us of the fact that this is not necessarily a linear, one-directional evolution. It seems that support for social-democratic politics is growing more strongly in the 'capitalised' parts of the Russian economy than in the more traditional segments of society.^[28] Peasants and workers (in the still substantial state-owned sectors of the economy and in the bureaucracy) might be equally interesting groups in an electoral sense, but they appear unreachable for social democracy as yet. If they do not support other parties; they stay at home on Election Day. The KPRF, on the other hand, comfortably enjoys its anti-systemic political profile. It enables to the party to link its actual involvement in the post-communist system, which serves the interests of many communist officials, with anti-systemic rhetoric, which still appeals to a large part of its rank-and-file and voters.

As a principally pro-democratic and pro-market economy political orientation social democracy finds itself in a much more difficult position. It cannot convincingly present itself as 'anti-systemic', but neither can it fully identify with the system as it developed in post-communist Russia. Russian social democracy is confronted with a series of difficult and well-known dilemmas. V. Kardail'ski, committee member of the SDPR succinctly put the early dilemma of Russian social democracy: 'Western social-democratic parties make capitalism more social; we must make socialism more capitalistic.'^[29] They are in favour of market-economic reforms, but the further rationalisation of the old state-owned sector and the bureaucracy will have more dramatic social consequences, and most of the potential victims of these reforms still see their interest best defend by the KPRF. Communism and social democracy in Russia are both forced to do painful political splits. As yet, the communists have performed better, but their task has been less difficult. Whether or not they will be able to combine their essentially contradictory interests, in- and outside of the system, remains to be seen. Popular opinion is slowly changing. A majority of the Russian population, irrespective of sex, age, occupation or education, accepts the idea of private enterprise in small and medium business in industry, service and agriculture. On the question of ownership of larger factories, energy and land, opinions are more differentiated. Age seems a decisive criterion. The older generation holds more negative views than youngsters do. In this respect, the further modernisation of Russian society will probably create more room for moderate left-wing politics. The essential question is: who will fill this political void: a reformed communist movement or new political forces, including perhaps social democracy?

The condition of social democracy in Russia is closely connected to the political situation at large. No social democracy without democracy. The cur-

rent constitutional order in Russia, however, seems not particularly conducive to a vigorous party political life, in- or exclusive of social democracy. The flawed division of power in Russia, the extreme strong (though not necessarily effective) executive presidential powers, the relatively impotent legislature, the highly informal and often rather 'personal' (i.e. non-institutionalised) nature of Kremlin politics, have reduced the relevance of parties in Russia's political process substantially.

Politics in Russia have been volatile. The frequency of governmental change was high. Electoral upheavals were accompanied by sudden and violent changes in the structure of the party political system. Parties came and went. Individual politicians seemed to consider them primarily as vehicles for their own political ambitions: from the structures of 'power' as the Russians prefer to name the parties most closely linked to the ruler(s) in the Kremlin, to the eternal oppositionalists of Yabloko or, to a lesser extent, the KPRF. The Duma might occasionally flex its muscles, but otherwise it does not present us with a pretty picture. Party leaders seem to spend their time and resources primarily on internecine quarrelling, tactical manoeuvring, and personal interests. Public opinion polls and, more important, voter turnout generally show a low trust in parties and politics. Political parties suffer from a lack of popular identification and legitimacy. At best, they are perceived as a by-product of democratisation, as a 'necessary evil'.^[30] The KPRF is likely to be the only major political formation in Russia today whose popular support does not depend primarily upon the charisma of its leader. Its supporters probably are the most ideologically committed of the whole electorate. The vast majority of Russian society, however, does neither have the time nor the energy to participate in party politics. They have other priorities. Still, political activity at the grass-roots level may be more dynamic than is generally assumed. Foreign observers are not inclined to look beyond the city-limits of Moscow and, at times, St. Petersburg, while our personal contacts with young politicians, in the bigger cities as well as in some regions, gives reasons for optimism. Civil society is slowly recovering from the devastating blows of the early 1990's, and political activism seems on the rise again. Young people are not necessarily a-political.

Whether or not presidential systems such as in the Russian Federation necessarily frustrate party development remains a controversial issue^[31], but the conditions under which political parties function in the Russian Federation (and most other republics in the region) today, reduce their relevance substantially. They remain weak and unpopular, poor countervailing forces, if not mere extensions of the executive or the political ambitions of individuals. This is not uniquely Russian. It applies to almost all of the former Soviet republics. Given its strong 'political' profile, social-democratic parties will find it even more difficult to function under such conditions than many others. The Russian Federation is among the majority of post-communist states that have developed somewhere in between the communist nomenklatu-

ra system and a kind of unconsolidated transitional regime (more, less or non-democratic). Russia never experienced the confrontation and social pressure, which functioned as a catalyst for democratic institutional change in most Central European states and the Baltics. The democratic opposition to communism never had the decisive strength to implement the institutions of power sharing or checks and balances. Russia's main transitional leaders were from within the ancien régime. They initiated a rapid process of change within a relatively brief time span, but they proved unable (or unwilling) to resist the rather authoritarian alternatives of the post-communist order.^[32]

Getting nowhere in the other CIS countries

Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the transformation process created even less fruitful conditions for democratic consolidation. One simple reason has been the preponderance of the national question. Most newly independent states were primarily concerned with defining their national identity (citizenship, language), building the necessary institutions (government, foreign service, armed forces etc.) and securing or re-orienting foreign economic relations (currency, trade relations). Social democrats – insofar as they existed at all – had no specific contribution to this process to make. The major political cleavage has been the one between nationalists and pro-Russian integrationists. While nationalists (most prominently in the Baltics, but also in Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) often advocated an orientation towards 'Europe' and a rapid dismantling of the remnants of Soviet hegemony, the integrationists favoured slower reforms and continued deeper relations with Russia. The nationalist camp was usually headed by a Popular Front, the integrationist by the communist party. The Popular Fronts gained power in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. They never obtained a majority in Belarus and Ukraine, however. Armenia is a special case as its nationalism is not necessarily anti-Russian. social-democratic parties tended to belong neither to the nationalist nor to the integrationist camp. With the nationalists they had in common the pro-European attitude and preference for rapid transition towards democracy and a (social) market economy, with the integrationists they share the interest in maintaining favourable economic relations with Russia and minimising the cost of disintegration.^[33]

Ukraine went through a rather smooth transition. The pro-independence stance of a substantial part of the communist leadership helped to diffuse potential confrontation between friends and foes of the old regime. In terms of party politics, however, the situation rather worsened than improved over the last decade.^[34] Ukraine has no 'historical' parties. The communist party was banned in 1991, and remained rather orthodox and inflexible (even more so than the KPRF) after its re-formation two years later. The Communist Party of the Ukraine (CPU) still defines itself as the inheritor of the ideas and traditions of the communist party of Soviet times. It has generally opposed economic reform (including privatisation), and clings to the impe-

rial traditions and cultural identity (pan-orthodoxy) of its link with Russia. The 'left vote' in the Ukraine has been persistently higher than in the Russian Federation. The communists' electoral stability during the parliamentary elections of 1994, 1998 and 2002 (although it has yet to return to government) did not stimulate them to alter their strategy, and prevented the communist party from 'social-democratisation'. It has made the CPU considerably more ideologically coherent than its Russian counterpart, the KPRF.

In the summer of 1991 the leader of the communists' parliamentary group Oleksandr Moroz carefully began to try to reform the party from within. He called upon the communists to loosen their ties with Moscow and to accept at least a minimum of economic change. Faced with his impotence, however, Moroz later established his own political formation, the Socialist Party. After a few years of political bickering and ideological soul-searching, the party announced a 'New Course' on social and economic policies. From the perspective of social democracy, the relative success of this alternative leftwing party distinguishes the Ukraine from Russia. The Socialist Party is essentially a post-communist successor-party. It's developed along the lines of other socialist parties elsewhere in the region (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary): nationalisation, namely to sever its political and ideological links with the former hegemonic power, and 'social democratisation', which implies the adaptation of a novel conception of socio- and economic reform and democratic change. The Socialist Party presents itself as a modern and moderate party, pro-reform, and anti-corruption. Its electoral successes have been limited, although not insignificant. The party won 6% of the popular vote in the last parliamentary elections (March 2002). As yet, the Socialist Party has few attractive allies, and it lacks the patronage and the clientelistic relations which dominate Ukrainian politics. Surprisingly however, the party beat one of its namesakes, the social-democratic Party (United) by 1% in the last Rada election. In a way, the united social democrats are very typical of the Ukrainian political 'condition'. It is an oligarch's party, 'owned' by some of the country's most wealthy figures. One of its leaders, Grigory Surkis, is the proud owner of the Dynamo Kiev football club. That is where the party's nickname comes from: Dynamo. The united social democrats attract its followers from the eastern part of the Ukraine, which is still strongly focused on Russia and harbours most of the country's mining and heavy industry. Whereas the united socialists have a similar pro-Russian orientation as the communists, the Socialist Party of Moroz attracts the more 'pro-Ukrainian' voters in the central part of the country and in its smaller towns.

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. Its political scene is strongly dominated by the communist party, which won a parliamentary majority in the last elections. Various parties carry the label of social democracy, but as yet, few can mobilise political power of any substance. The 'national' issue (relations with Russia and Romania, the future of Trans-Dniestria) dominates political life, while the dramatic socio-economic condition of the country

actually begs for attention. The social-democratic Party of Moldova was unable to pass the threshold in the 1994, 1998 and 2001 elections. It is estimated to have less than 10,000 members.

In Central Asia and in Belarus the post-communist order was essentially imposed from above: no democratic actors of real importance, no power sharing, no compromise, but hegemonic change from within by autocratic leaders (and civil war, in Tajikistan). The party political system in these countries is either seriously underdeveloped, because repressed, or non-existent. The main dividing line in Belarus politics is for or against president Aleksandr Lukashenka. The opposition against Lukashenka is organised in the Consultative Council of Parties. The Belarusian social-democratic Party or Hramada joined the Council. The party was established in 1991 as a successor to the Belarusian Hramada of 1903. It strongly opposes Lukashenka, demands democratic reform and membership of the European Union and of the Council of Europe. The party has no formal relations with the Socialist International.

There is no social-democratic movement of any relevance in Central Asia, and there is not much reason to believe that societal interests (if opposition is allowed at all) will crystallise along the lines of European political traditions. Religious differences, the various shades of Islam in particular, will probably be more relevant. Only Azerbaijan, another Islamic society, but under a less repressive regime, knows a social-democratic party. Heydar Aliyev, former KGB-chief and member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has ruled the country since the presidential elections of October 3, 1993. The government has a poor human rights record. Politics in Azerbaijan are volatile, repressive, and, given the oil industry, extremely lucrative. Political parties were slow to emerge and generally represent clientele structures. The founding congress of the social-democratic Party of Azerbaijan (SDPA) was held in December 1989. It was the first non-communist party to be officially registered. The party closely co-operates with other opposition parties, both communist and Islamic. Membership is limited. Approximately 2,000 people, particularly in the capital city of Baku have joined the SDPA, which has an observer status with the SI. 'The politicisation of Islam has helped drive the secular opposition into the corner', says Zardusht Alizade, co-chairman of the social-democratic Party of Azerbaijan. 'A holy place is never empty, and the population has reached out for the mosques. The politicisation of Islam was the reaction of the lower classes to the introduction of such attributes of western mass culture as beauty contests, the cult of eroticism, the legalisation of sexual minorities, and the provocative consumption of the upper classes. The ethical Puritanism of the conservative sectors of the population manifested itself in the form of devotion to the Islamic behest of their forebears.'¹³⁵

Conclusion

Conclusion

Social democracy has experienced a varied fate in the post-communist world of Central and Eastern Europe. A fate which largely reflects the general political development in the region. System change (the multi-faceted transition most post-communist countries are going through) and state formation or sometimes even nation building (after gaining independence) are the two most crucial issues. Other, related but more specific problems have further defined the position of social democracy: the advance of democracy, both in terms of institutions and of political culture; the kind of political systems established proved to be a relevant variable, social democrats tend to fare better in a parliamentary than in a presidential order; and the tempo and direction of economic reform seems to have been an important factor, the higher the standard of living and the more advanced the market economy, the better social democracy tends to perform.

In the rapidly reforming western part of the region, which has anyway been historically more developed and is now heading towards EU membership, social democracy has (re-)organised itself in powerful political formations, thereby achieving sometimes surprising electoral successes. In Central Europe social democracy has won elections and led governments; they have subsequently lost elections, but, as in Poland and Hungary, they were able to regain power after a second spell in the opposition. The Czech social-democratic Party even won a second consecutive term in office, after winning elections of June 2002 – an exceptional event in the volatile political environment of the post-communist world. Measured by the share of deputies in the national parliaments, social democrats in Central Europe have almost continuously increased their share: from below 1% in 1990 to 21% in 2001 with an average share over these 11 years of 14,5% (see the Annexe 2).

The building of capitalism may not have been a typical social-democratic mission, but in the Central European countries, social democrats have taken this assignment rather seriously, even more seriously sometimes than their politically more conservative competitors. However, social-democratic parties have not been able to prevent an increasingly negative attitude towards further economic and political change (or better, towards the market and the democratic polity as they actually function). These sentiments have certainly contributed to their electoral defeats, but they neither marginalised them nor did they prevent them from returning to power relatively quickly. This not only highlights the poor and disappointing record of their political competitors, but also the strong and lasting legitimacy of social

democracy itself in these countries (in terms of ideology, organisation and personnel).

Except for a few parties on the far right and left of the political spectre, EU membership and integration into Europe is generally accepted as a beneficial option by all political actors in East-Central Europe. In this respect the gap seems to have widened between popular approval of EU membership (which has decreased considerably over the last decade) and party political support for further integration. Social democrats have been among the most vocal and convinced advocates of further integration. Open Euro-scepticism is a rare sentiment among them, despite the obvious adverse effects of the accession trajectory.

In comparison with the Central European countries, reforms in South-East Europe have progressed at a slower pace, additionally impeded by war and ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia. social-democratic parties, as did all other political formations, not only had to cope with the specific heritage of communism in the region (an issue which we tend to forget), but also with the devastating effects of civil war and with the need to reconstruct their countries under post-war conditions, with a deep involvement of the international community. Social democracy has generally fared less well in this part of the post-communist world than in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic, but still managed to play a substantial role in some countries. The respective values in terms of share of parliamentary seats grew from 5,2% in 1990 (thanks to Macedonia with 25,8%) to 13,2% in 2001 and an eleven-year average of 10,3%, i.e. about two thirds of the value of the ten accession countries (see the Annexe 2).

Generally, social democracy has turned into a major domestic force supporting international co-operation and integration in the Balkan region. In many countries it came to be the most credible alternative to the nationalist or conservative forces, which are naturally inclined to perceive international relations as a negative-sum game and fear foreign dominance and the loss of sovereignty more than they appreciate the benefits of foreign support and international exchange. Foreign interference, i.e. western insistence on human and minority rights, democracy, and good governance is often considered as a threat to the national interest (as they perceive them), whilst social democrats tend to share a definition of national interest which is more compatible with the dominant international view. This proved to be particularly relevant in the case of former Yugoslavia. It did not so much imply that they won the national elections on a foreign policy agenda, but that they were generally accepted by the representatives of the International Community as reliable factors of stability and reconciliation (more so in any way than most of the nationalist parties).

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a separate story. The states of the former Soviet Union are a motley collection: from the relatively stable democracies in the Baltic area, through repressive regimes in Belarus

and, although differently shaped, its neighbouring countries, to dictatorships, sometimes religiously inspired and dominated by family cliques, in Central Asia. And there is the Russian Federation – a flawed democracy at best. In the CIS social democracy's influence has been virtually negligible. social-democratic ideas and values might be found among various movements, as there are numerous political parties that consider themselves social-democratic, but they never reached a position of political relevance, let alone that they won elections. Their share of deputies remained always below 1,75%.

The reasons why social democracy has generally performed so poorly in the former Soviet Union, are not only the lack of democracy itself in many of these countries, but also the strong position of the still largely unreconstructed communist parties, such as the KPRF in Russia or the CPU in Ukraine, the many clashing egos and other personal preoccupations, and, obviously, the lack of a real constituency. The middle-groups among whom social-democratic parties could be expected to recruit their main following, are still mostly underdeveloped. In many cases, social democracy has remained a toy of rather isolated political activists, some intellectuals of good will, and a few frustrated political adventures. There are exceptions: the SDPR in Russia, led by Gorbachev, might be considered as a relatively serious attempt at social-democratic party building (although it is still far too early to estimate its real potential), and so could the Socialist Party of Aleksandr Moroz in the Ukraine. Elsewhere, the picture is bleak. The political environment is not conducive to party politics in general; the economic situation, especially the low standard of living and the poor record of market reforms, is not very helpful either; and society has remained essentially uninterested, deaf to the ideas and suggestions of the small social-democratic parties in their midst, reasonable and attractive as they may seem.

List of Abbreviations

ARF	Armenian Socialist Party
BiH	Bosnia Herzegovina
BSDP	Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (Narodnya Hramada)
BSDP	Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPU	Communist Party of the Ukraine
CSFR	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
ČSSD	Czech Social-Democratic Party
CUG	Citizens' Union of Georgia
DEPOS	Democratic Movement of Serbia
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DPS	Democratic Party Saimnieks (Latvia)
DPS	Democratic Party of Socialists (Montenegro)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FKGP	Smallholders Party (Hungary)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSS	Civic Alliance of Serbia
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HSLS	Croatian Social Liberal Party
HZDS	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDEA	(International) Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LC	Latvia's Way
LDDP	Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party
LDS	Liberal Democrats of Slovenia
LSDP	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party
LSI	Labour and Socialist International
LSV	League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina
LZS	Latvia's Peasants Union
MSZDP	Hungarian Social-Democratic Party

KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party (Hungary)
KMÜ	Coalition Party and Rural Union (Estonia)
KPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MSZDP	Hungarian Social-Democratic Party
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ODS	Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PD	Democratic Party (Romania)
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany)
PDSR	Romanian Party of Social Democracy
PPS	Polish Socialist Party
PSL	Polish Peasants Party
PSD	Social-Democratic Party (Romania)
PSDR	Romanian Social Democratic Party
PSSH	Socialist Party of Albania
PSDSH	Social Democratic Party of Albania
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SDH	Social Democracy of Croatia
SDL	Slovak Party of the Democratic Left
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro)
SDPA	Social Democracy of Azerbaijan
SDPR	Social Democracy Party of Russia
SDPR	Social Democracy of the Polish Republic
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SDSM	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SDSS	Social Democratic Party of Slovenia
SDU	Social Democratic Union (Serbia)
SED	United Socialist Party of Germany
SI	Socialist International
SKD	Christian Democrats of Slovenia
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SK-SDP	League of Communists – Party of Democratic Change (Bosnia, Croatia)
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance (Poland)
SNSD	Party of Independent Social Democrats (Republika Srpska)
SPD	Social-Democratic Party of Germany
SPÖ	Social-Democratic Party of Austria
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
SPT	Socialist Party of Workers (Russia)
SRS	Serbian Radical Party
SSSD	Slovak Social-Democratic Party

SUCEE	Socialist Union of East-Central Europe
SZDSZ	Federation of Free Democrats (Hungary)
SDS	Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USDP	United Social-Democratic Party (Russia)
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZLSD	United List of Social democrats (Slovenia)

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Notes

- [1] See Kitschelt (1999), pp. 223-261.
- [2] Szelenyi (1997), pp. 190-224. as quoted in Cook (1999), p.48
- [3] I.e. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- [4] E.g. Freedom House; for a survey on democratisation see Dauderstädt and Gerrits (2000), pp. 361-376
- [5] For a profound analysis see Kitschelt (1999).
- [6] See European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (2001), Table A3.1, p. 59.
- [7] See the book with the same title by Hall and Soskice (2001) as well as a wealth of further literature like Albert (1991), or Crouch and Streeck (1997).
- [8] See Esping-Andersen (1990)
- [9] Delhey (2001), p. 250, Table 61.
- [10] The former Yugoslavia refers to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 1945-92, otherwise known as the second Yugoslavia. The first Yugoslavia 1918-1945, was founded as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The third Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was formed by Serbia and Montenegro in 1992.
- [11] See Goldstein (1999), p.249.
- [12] See Thomas (1999).
- [13] Thomas (1999), p. 124.
- [14] Thomas (1999), p.268.
- [15] Goldstein (1999), p. 258.
- [16] See Thomas (1999), p.119.
- [17] See World Bank (2002).
- [18] See World Bank (2002).
- [19] International Crisis Group (1998).
- [20] European Commission (2002), p. 163.
- [21] Personal conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev (December 9, 2000).
- [22] March (2001), p. 271; see also March 2002.
- [23] See Studeniki (2002), pp. 110-120.
- [24] Personal conversation with Boris Guseletov (December 17, 2001).
- [25] Sotsial-demokrat, November 2, 2001.
- [26] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 10, 2001.
- [27] Shmelov (1999), p. 18.
- [28] Christensen (1998), p. 347.
- [29] See Rabochazhev & Yashlavski (2001), pp. 10, 21-36.

- [30] Juchler (1997), p. 902.
- [31] See Ishiyama & Kennedy (2001), pp.1177-1191.
- [32] McFaul (2002), pp. 212-244.
- [33] See Abdelal (2001), pp. 76-83 for most CIS countries except Ukraine (pp. 108-116), and Belarus (pp. 134-142).
- [34] See Wilson (2002), pp.21-59.
- [35] Fuller (2002).

Annexes 1

Country-by-Country Survey of Social Democratic Parties

The following country profiles, originally compiled (1999) in a first version by Hans-Joachim Strewe, have been up-dated and revised by Nadezda Redrikova and Liesbeth van de Grift in 2001/2002 and again in September 2002 by Kirsten Meijer and Irma Hesp. It provides a country-by-country overview of social-democratic parties in East-Central Europe.

Of course, the very nature of the subject implies that the situation is in a constant state of flux. Trying to keep-up with these developments can be a bewildering task, help however is at hand with a number of interesting web-sites. The European Forum for Solidarity and Democracy has a site specifically related to information about the development of social-democratically oriented political parties, organisations and individuals in Central and Eastern Europe – www.europeanforum.net. Daily reports and background information can be found at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty site www.rferl.org. Election results can be found at www.ifes.org and www.electionworld.org. An impressive site dedicated to information about parties and organisations of a democratic socialist persuasion can be found at www.socialist.org. A link to a plethora of politically related sites can be found at www.psr.keele.ac.uk. Additionally, many of the parties mentioned below have their own sites often with English language sections.

Albania

In Albania both the historic Albanian social-democratic Party (Partia Social Demokraike e Shqipërisë – PSDSH) and the post-communist Albanian Socialist Party (Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë – PSSH) consider themselves as social-democratic.

The PSDSH was founded in April 1991, in the aftermath of the first free parliamentary elections of March/April. In the second election a year later, the PSDSH won 7 of 140 mandates. The PSDSH failed to secure a mandate in the elections of May 1996, which were generally recognised as fraudulent, and in December 1996 it joined the 'Forum for Democracy', which included the Albanian Socialist Party. In June 1997 it managed to secure 8 of 155 seats in the parliamentary elections, and it formed, until the June 2001 elections, part of the PSSH led coalition government providing two junior ministers. It left the government over the proposed constitution. In the last 2001 election the PSDSH received 3,6% of votes in the 140 seat parliament and again formed a coalition government with the Socialist Party, Democratic Alliance Party,

and Human Rights Union Party. The party's vice-chairman, Paskal Milo, is minister of Foreign Affairs.

Skënder Gjinushi, the former minister of Education, has been head of the party since its foundation and is Speaker of Parliament.

address Rr. Asim Vokshi 26, Tirana, Albania

The post-communist PSSH participated in the first free elections with its old name 'Albanian Workers Party'. After winning 169 of the 250 parliamentary seats in April 1991, primarily due to the nature of the electoral system (single member constituencies) and its dominance in the countryside, the party changed its name to the Albanian Socialist Party. After the elections a government of national salvation was formed in a bid to cope with the countries growing crisis. In the following elections in 1992 and 1996 the PSSH lost its majority by winning just 38 and 10 seats respectively. Electoral defeat as a facilitator of change was clearly evident when in 1996 the party took the first major steps towards social democratisation. All references to Marxist-Leninism were abandoned and the party was at the forefront of organising the "Forum for Democracy", which brought together various groups from across the political spectrum, including those that earlier were violently suppressed by the Albanian Workers Party.

Following continuous economic decline, the collapse of a countrywide pyramid scheme, and widespread civil unrest, the PSSH returned to power, winning 101 of 155 mandates. After the elections in summer 1997, the former secretary general of the party, Rexhep Mejdani, became president and chairman Fatos Nano prime minister. Fourteen months later Nano resigned, in the wake of unrest as a result of the murder of a leading opposition politician, and was replaced by Pandeli Majko. With this replacement a new generation came to power, with no ties to the communist past. The new government attempted to bring a sense of stability with a new constitution adopted in November 1998, and increased contacts with the international social-democratic left. However, at the 1999 Congress of PSSH Fatos Nano was re-elected as party leader. After this, Majko resigned as prime minister. He was succeeded by 30-year old Ilir Meta, who beat Makbule Ceco, a confidant of Fatos Nano. The Socialist Party also won the June 2001 parliamentary election and secured 73 of 140 mandates, thereby securing a leading position in parliament and government. The party relies on support from rural areas, although support in the main cities is increasing.

At present the PSDSH is a full member of the Socialist International. The PSSH has consultative membership.

However, the generation struggle within the PSSH continued. In January 2002 Ilir Meta quit his job after months of feuding with Fatos Nano, who attempted to prevent the prime minister from filling vacancies in his cabinet. A month later, parliament voted for a new cabinet, led by Pandeli Majko. The appointment of Majko as prime minister is seen as a setback for Nano. The

presidential elections in June were won by the all-party-candidate Alfred Moisiu. Nano then put pressure on Majko in his ambition to become prime minister. In July Nano succeeded and presented a new cabinet. This was the 3rd Albanian government in 6 months. It became possible after the PSSH steering committee changed its statutes to enable the party leader to serve as prime minister at the same time. Former prime ministers Ilir and Meta both remain members of Nano's cabinet.

Azerbaijan

Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (SDPA) – The founding conference of the SDPA was held on December 10th, 1989 with most members coming from the Popular Front, the main opposition party in Azerbaijan. The party was the first non-communist party to be officially registered (June 1990). The SDPA is different from other parties, as it is less personality based and more programmatic. The SDPA stands for the building of a civic society in Azerbaijan. It advocated a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia through negotiations, and it favoured cultural autonomy for national minorities. The SDPA has been criticised because of its connections both with the Communist Party and the Islamic Party. The three parties have formed a co-operation bloc. The social democrats argue that this is the only way to push these parties into a more moderate, social-democratic direction. Furthermore, they consider the social aspects of the party programmes to be very much alike. The SDPA has 2,000 members mainly in Baku and one other region, Ganja. Araz Alizadeh is party chairman. He lives in exile in Moscow. His brother Zardust Alizadeh is acting chairman.

On the 24th of August 2002 a referendum on constitutional amendments was conducted, and the proposed changes by president Aliyev were accepted. The most controversial issue was the call for a change in the presidential succession process. The international community and the opposition condemned the referendum as illegal, because of widespread fraud.

The SDPA has observer status in the Socialist International.

Armenia

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutiune (ARF – Armenian Socialist Party) was originally established in 1890. Between 1918 and 1920 it was the strongest political force in Armenia prior to its prohibition by the communists. Re-established in 1990, it was outlawed by president Levon Ter-Petrossian in December 1994 on the pretext that it was not a national Armenian organisation and that it harboured terrorists. During the 1995 election, the ban proved effective: Dashnak won only 0,5% of the votes. Since then, the party's popularity has increased rapidly. In 1998 Ter-Petrossian's decision was revoked, following his resignation, and the party provided two government ministers and an advisor to the new president Robert Kocharian. During the 1999 elections ARF gained 9 seats. ARF -Dashnaktsutiun delivered

one minister (minister of Culture, Sport and Youth) to the government.

The party has a strong nationalistic orientation, rooted in the persecution of Armenians by the Turks in 1915. It is closely linked to the political leadership of the Mount-Karabach region and retains a world-wide network in the large Armenian Diaspora. The party chair is Hrair Karapetyan. Since November 1999 it is a consultative member party of the Socialist International.

address p.o. box 19226, 11710 Athens, Greece

Internet: www.arf.am

Belarus

In the Republic of Belarus the first major self-proclaimed social-democratic party was the Belarussian Social-Democratic Hramada (Belaruskaja Sazyial-Demokratytschnaja Hramada BSDH). It was founded in 1991, emerging from the national democratic Belarussian Popular Front. Between 1992-1995 its chairman was Oleg Trusov and the party had 15 members of parliament. In 1995 the party claimed to have 4000 members. In the parliamentary elections of the same year, as part of an electoral bloc called the social-democratic Assembly (which obtained 12 seats), the Hramada secured 2 mandates out of a total number of 260 seats. Only 198 parliamentary seats were occupied and 62 remained vacant. The democratic opposition parties, including the BSDH, refused to take their seats after a referendum deprived the parliament of real power. This referendum, initiated by president Lukashenko in May 1996, prolonged the president's term and gave him the right to appoint members of the constitutional court. It caused a constitutional crisis, but the referendum was pushed through anyway, and was accepted by more than a 70% majority. The international observers (OSCE) considered the election results as fraudulent. Momentarily, the democratic opposition has no parliamentary representation.

In June 1996, the BSDH and the Belarussian Popular Front merged with the Party of Popular Unity, forming the Belarussian Social Democratic Party (National Hramada) (Belaruskaja Sazyial-Demokratytschnaja Partija (Narodnaja Hramada), BSDP). Its chairperson is Nicolai Statkevich. The BSDP programme aspires to adapt 'classical values of European social democracy' to Belarussian standards. The party opposes Lukashenko, demands a democratic, legal and social state, membership of the European Council and eventually of the European Union.

Several members of the BSDP have been arrested. The BSDP leader Nikolai Statkevich was imprisoned several times.

Meanwhile, a group led by Oleg Trusov split from the party and founded a new Hramada in 1998, which is closer to the national democratic Belarussian Popular Front. The former president of Belarus (1991 - 1994), Stanislav S. Shushkevich, joined this party.

In October 2000 parliamentary elections took place in Belarus. Presi-

dent Lukashenko tried to block them, but under international pressure he was forced to hold the elections. However the elections were not carried out according to the law but to the personal scenario of the president. The BSDP decided to boycott the elections. Later, however, Statkevich called the boycott a serious mistake and claimed that participation could create an opposition bloc in parliament. He holds the opinion that the opposition should infiltrate power, and therefore should participate in any elections, even openly unfair ones.

In September 2001 presidential elections took place and Lukashenka was elected for another five years term. The BSDP took an active part in the elections. More than 4,500 activists of the party participated in a campaign, which resulted in collection of 220,000 signatures in support of democratic candidates for the presidency.

None of the social-democratic parties had any status with the SI. Only recently the BSDP became an observer party.

address Skaryny Ave. 153-2-107, 220114 Minsk, Belarus

Internet: www.bsdp.org

Bosnia-Herzegovina

In the Muslim-Croat Federation, one entity within the Bosnian State, two social-democratic parties existed until their merger on 27 February 1999: the SD and the SDP.

The Social Democrats Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Socijaldemokrati, SD) had 2 seats in the Federal parliament and 6 seats in the Muslim-Croat Federation parliament. The SD has its roots in the reform-minded wing of the youth branch of the League of Communists. It was founded in 1990 as the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Unija Bosanskih Social Demokrate, UBSD), but changed its name to Socijaldemokrati. The SD was a moderate party and a strong supporter of multi-ethnic society within a united Bosnia-Herzegovina. The party claimed to organise 40,000 members. The former party leader, until the merger, Selim Beslagic, is mayor of Tuzla.

The Social Democratic Party BiH (Socijal Demokratska Partija, SDP-BiH) had 2 seats in the Federal parliament, 19 seats in the Federation parliament, and 2 seats in the Republika Srpska parliament. The SDP has a representation in both the Muslim-Croat and the Serb entity. The SDP originally sprang from the League of Communist, the leading party in pre-war Federal Yugoslavia. The SDP, formerly the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Stranka Socijaliste, DSS) was a moderate party, in favour of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under the party leadership of Zlatko Lagumizija, it advocated social policies. The party was strong in industrial areas and among the military. SDP membership was open to all ethnic groups in the country. Even though it had few members, its parliamentary group was bigger than that of the SD. The mayor of Brcko is a high-ranking SDP official.

After a year of negotiations between both parties and under strong

international pressure the SD and SDP merged. The new party is called Bosnian Social Democratic Party and is headed by SDP party leader Zlatko Lagumizija. In the November 2000 elections the united party received 18% of the votes and 9 out of 42 seats in the Federal parliament.

The only social-democratically oriented party in the Republika Srpska is the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Sojuz Nezavisna Socijalistička Demokratska, SNSD). It was founded in February 1992 in Banja Luka. During the war, the founder and party leader Milorad Dodik stayed in the Republika Srpska and actively promoted inter-ethnic tolerance. The SNSD formed the Sloga (Unity) coalition to be able to compete with the nationalists in the Republika Srpska. The SNSD is western oriented and focused on co-operation with parties of other ethnic groups. Party leader Milorad Dodik has been the only prime minister candidate who is acceptable to High Commissioner Westendorp.

The SDP-BiH has a full member status in the Socialist International.

address SDP: Alipasina 41, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

e-mail: sdp-bih@sdp-bih.net

Bulgaria

In March 1990, the Bulgarian Communist Party voted to rename itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (Balgarska Socialisticheska Partija – BSP). The party, which had been in power from 1990 till 1991, occupied 211 of the 400 seats in Grand Assembly; from 1994 till 1997 it had 125 out of 240 seats in parliament. In the 1997 elections, the BSP was defeated by the opposition SDS (Union of Democratic Forces). In the same year a group of BSP members critical of the party line left, and joined the newly-established social-democratic Bulgarian Euroleft (see below). Since the June 2001 election the BSP, led by Georgi Parvanov, has been represented in parliament with 36 seats. The wide range of opinions (ranging from the hard line communist ‘Open forum’ to more moderate forces) made it difficult to present clear party policies. In November 2001 Parvanov unexpectedly won the presidential elections by 53% over incumbent president Stoyanov. As its new party leader the BSP elected Sergei Stanishev, allegedly a representative of the reform-minded wing of BSP.

address BSP: 20, Pozitano Street, 1000 Sofia.

e-mail: bsp@bsp.bg

Internet: www.bsp.bg (en)

Bulgarian Euroleft (Balgarska Evrolevica – BEL) is a social-democratically oriented party, which was formed in 1997 out of the BSDP fraction Movement for Social Humanism, Alternative Socialist Organisation (a BSP split-off) and the Civic Alliance for the Republic, and was joined by reformist and social democrat BSP dissidents. The BEL won 14 of the 240 seats in parliament in 1997 with 5.8% of the vote. It gained an additional three seats when other deputies

joined the BEL. The party signed an agreement with the Bulgarian United Social Democratic Party (BESDP) and the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BZNS) concerning joint participation in the 2001 parliamentary elections. The coalition did not win any seats though. Alexander Tomov is party chairman.

At the Congress of the BEL in June 2000 the Euroleft split up and a new political movement ‘Social Democrats’ (Politichesko Dvijenie Socialdemokrati – PDS) was established. The main self-declared objective of PDS is to unite the social democrats and to establish a powerful social-democratic party or coalition. The party received 2 seats in the new parliament as a result of joint co-operation with the BSP (New Left).

address Euroleft: Internet: www.euroleft-bg.org

Until November 1998, the traditional Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (Balgarska Socialna Demokraticheska Partija – BSDP) was chaired by Petar Dertliev. From the parliamentary elections in 1997 until June 2001 it had two seats, which it gained as a part of an election alliance with United Democratic Forces (SDS), which held 137 of 240 seats. These two MPs formed their own party, however, which pursued a policy of rapprochement with the SDS. At the beginning of 2001 this party won a court case about the legal right to the name BSDP. The new BSDP, led by Yordan Nihrisov, again joined the SDS coalition for the 2001 parliamentary election and thus received 2 seats in the parliament.

address BSDP Internet: www.bsdp.net

United Labour Block (Obedinen blok na truda, OBT) – was formed by KNSB trade union chairman Krastyu Petkov, after his last term as chairman ended. It presented itself as a bridge builder between the other left wing forces in the country. It is one of the four left wing parties, which signed the memorandum ‘New Left’. OBT received 1 seat in the last parliamentary election.

Bulgarian United Social-Democratic Party (BESDP – Obedineni Socialdemokrati) – was formed at the beginning of 2000, after the death of Petar Dertliev, as a result of a split from the BSDP. Party leader: Valkana Todorova. The party contested the 2001 elections in coalition with Euroleft, which did not pass the threshold of 4%.

The BESDP is a full member of the Socialist International. The Euroleft has an observer status in SI. The BSP (chaired by Sergei Stanishev) does not have a SI-status.

In January 2001, six months before the parliamentary elections, four left parties signed a political memorandum ‘New Left’, aiming at the unification of the left, BEL and BESDP did not join this initiative.

Croatia

The Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP) was the strongest leftist opposition party in Croatia until the January 2000 elections. It came about as a result of an amalgamation of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDSH), chaired by Antun Vujic, and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia – Party of Democratic Reforms (SPH-SDP), a post-communist party chaired by Ivica Račan. Both forces had emerged from the Croatian League of Communists (SKH). The SDP advocates a policy of non-interference in internal affairs and the establishment of relations with neighbouring countries on the principle of mutual recognition of territorial integrity, sovereignty and respect for internationally recognised borders. The SDP has always been a multi-ethnic party with both Serb and Muslim members and it claims to believe in a multi-ethnic Croatia. It strives for integration in the West through the EU and NATO. The SDP has been growing steadily since the elections in 1992 (5.4%) and 1995 (8.9%). In the 2000 election, a milestone in the political life of Croatia, the ruling HDZ was defeated by the election coalition consisting of Social Democrats (SDP) and Social Liberal (HSL). The SDP received 29% of the votes and secured 44 mandates in the Zastupnicki dom (Parliament of Croatia). It became the largest government party. Party leader Račan is now prime minister. Two of the three vice ministers as well as three key ministers – Finance, Foreign, and Interior ministers – also have leading positions in the SDP. The party claims to have approximately 25,000 members.

The Social Democratic Union of Croatia (Socijalno Demokratska Unija, SDU) is a small party, without parliamentary representation. It emerged from the Federation of Reform Forces. Its chairperson is Branko Horvath. The SDU has many Serb and leftist intellectuals among its members. The SDU was the only social-democratic party that opposed the 'military' solutions in the Serb populated Krajina in Croatia.

The Social Democratic Action of Croatia (Akcija Socijaldemokrata Hrvatske, ASH) was established under the chairpersonship of Silvije Degen, in 1994, as a coalition of the Socialist Party of Croatia; the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia chaired by Ivan Siber; the Social-Democratic Union under Dragutin Palasek, and the Croatian People's Party chaired by Miko Tripalo. The party was unable to pass the 5% barrier in the 1995 elections, but won one seat in the elections of January 2000. The overriding goal of the party is the idea of a multi-ethnic society and the integration of Croatia in the EU. In fact the party is a very marginal player in Croatian politics.

In July 2001 the Croatian government of Račan ran into difficulties. The International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague asked for the extradition of generals who were in function during operation Storm in the Krajina area. The issue is highly controversial, but Račan's claim that the Croatian government had to fulfil its international obligations was still broadly accepted. In July 2002 Račan had to form a new government. The liberal coalition partner

resigned because of a series of political disagreements. Račan added another SDP official to the cabinet.

The SDP is a full member of the Socialist International. The ASH and SDU have no SI-status.

address SDP Iblerov Trg 9, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia

Internet: www.sdp.tel.hr

e-mail: sdp@sdp.tel.hr

Czech Republic

The Czech Social Democratic Party Ceska Strana Sociáln Demokratická – CSSD was originally founded in 1878. In 1948, it was forced to unify with the Communist Party, but an exile-organisation continued to exist. Following the party's re-founding in November 1989, politicians, formally in exile, dominated it. Until the XXVI Congress in 1993 the (SSD was heavily divided. The election of Milos Zeman as party chairman was to mark a turnabout in the nature of the party's organisational structure, overall strategy and electoral performance.

The CSSD has around 14,000 party members within 1,000 local branches.

In the elections for the National Council (the parliament of the Czech part of the country) in the summer of 1992 (the Czechoslovak state ceased to exist on January 1, 1993), it won 16 of the 200 seats (6.5% of the vote). Elections four years later, in an independent Czech Republic, brought the CSSD an increase of deputies to 61 out of 200 seats (26.4% of the vote), making it the second strongest party in parliament after the governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Early elections two years later witnessed another increase in support, up to 32.3% of the popular vote and 74 of 200 seats. This has been enough for the party to form a minority government tolerated by the ODS. This government, led by party chairman Zeman as prime minister, remained in power until 2002

In 2001, Zeman resigned as chairman of the CSSD and Vladimir Spidla (then minister for Labour and Social Affairs) was elected as new chairman. In the elections of 2002, the party succeeded in winning more than 30% of the votes and it became the strongest party. Vladimir Spidla formed a coalition government with the Christian Democrats and Liberals.

The CSSD is a full member of the Socialist International.

address 550 Hybernska 7, 11000 Praha 1, Czech Republic

Internet: www.cssd.cz

Estonia

In 1990, the Estonian Social Democratic Party (Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Party – ESDP) – numbering some 300 members at that time – had 2 representatives in Parliament. Following the 1992 parliamentary elections, the ESDP gained 12 of 101 seats as part of an electoral alliance with the Estonian Rural Centre Party (EMK). This went on to call itself Mõõdukad (The

Moderates). After the 1995 elections the number of mandates declined to 6. Until 1996, Marju Lauristin was chairman of the party. In 1996 the previous electoral alliance established itself as a party – Mõõdukad Party (The Moderates) – led by the former prime minister and politically ‘independent’ Anders Tarand. It remains to be seen whether the Moderates favour ‘social liberal’ or ‘social-democratic’ policies. In practice, Mõõdukad policies and those of Tarand were slightly to the ‘right’ of most of their European fellow-parties.

However, in 1998 the Estonian Parliament adopted a law by which electoral alliances were forbidden, in order to reduce the number of parties represented in parliament. Subsequently, Mõõdukad and the centre-left People’s Party (Rahvaerakond) decided to present a united list and announced a merger in the near future. The joint list was quite fortunate in the March 1999 elections; it won 15.22% of the votes, thus becoming the fourth biggest party in parliament. Four key positions – Foreign minister (Toomas Hendrik Ilves), secretary of Trade and Industry (Mihkel Põrnoja), Social Affairs minister (Eiki Nestor), and Agriculture (Ivari Padar) were taken by members of the party. Toomas Hendrik Ilves is chairman. The party approximately has 3500 members. The party emphasises the importance of a well-regulated market system accompanied by welfare policies. The fight against unemployment has a high priority. Furthermore, it advocates a strong and efficient public sector, needed to carry out transfer payments and services, like free education and health care. The official merger of both Mõõdukad and Rahvaerakond took place in November 1999. The united party carries the name Mõõdukad.

address Mõõdukad: p.o. box 3437, 0090 Tallinn, Estonia

Internet: www.moodukad.ee/

The Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party (Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Tööpartei) changed its name into Estonian Democratic Labour Party in December 1997. It is the successor of the pre-1991 communist party, especially its Estonian membership. The party has not made a clear break with its past and mainly attracts ‘nostalgic’ voters. In the current parliament it has no seats, although it won two seats in the previous elections in coalition with the Estonian United People’s Party. ESDLP is against EU and NATO accession. They have one seat in Riigikogu, as the Chairman Tiit Toomsalu was running on the list of the Estonian United People’s Party.

Mõõdukad has full membership status in the Socialist International. The ESDLP has no SI affiliation.

address ESDLP: p.o. box 4102, 10143 Tallinn, Estonia

Internet: www.esdtp.ee

Georgia

In late 1993, former Soviet foreign minister, and present Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze founded the Citizen Union of Georgia (SMK).

According to the European Forum country updates ‘the great majority of the party’s parliamentarians present themselves as social democrats, but SMK shows no signs of social-democratic values. The SMK can best be described as a nomenklatura based party.’ Until the 1995/1996 elections the SMK held 107 of 235 seats in the Georgian parliament. After the last election in 1999 the Citizen Union of Georgia strengthened its position and is now represented with 119 seats in parliament. The so-called ‘reform group’ within the SMK is in charge of elaborating the reform policy issues in parliament. Eduard Sumanidze succeeded Shevardnadze after the president stepped down as party chairman in September 2001.

address SMK Marshal Gelovani Avenue 4a, 380019 Tbilisi

The Socialist Party of Georgia (SPG), chaired by Vachtang Rcheulischwili, was formed in 1995 after splitting from the Citizen Union. It claims to be the successor of the historic Georgian Socialist Federalist Party. It is a social-democratic oriented group, represented by 11 deputies (of a total of 235 seats) in parliament after the 1995/1996 elections. For the 1999 elections the SPG joined forces with the political bloc Revival of Georgia, and together they gained 12 seats in parliament. The SPG has been the driving force behind the Black Sea Assembly of Left of Centre Parties.

address SPG e-mail spg: spg@geo-plus.net

The Social Democratic Party of Georgia (SSDP) is a new formation that remains torn between the SMK and the SPG. It claims to maintain the tradition of the historic social-democratic Party that had participated in the government during Georgia’s independence between 1918 and 1921. In 1999 it split into two smaller parties: the Georgian Independent Social Democratic Party (chairman: David Lomidze) and the SSDP, led by Yemal Kakhiaşvili. Both parties presently lack parliamentary representation.

The SMK has observer status in the Socialist International. Neither the Socialist nor the Social-Democratic Party of Georgia has SI-status.

address CUG e-mail: cug@eccess.sanet.ge

Hungary

The Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP) was founded on October 6, 1989 following the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) during its final (XIII) party congress. While elements of the MSZMP continue to exist under the name of MUNKÁSPÁRT (Workers’ Party) the MSZP argues that ‘politically speaking the Hungarian Socialist Party is neither the successor to, nor heir of the HSWP, but a democratic left-wing party adapting to the demands of the new socio-economic situation and a political organisation advocating the principles of democratic socialism. It is the co-equal in an alliance of various ideological trends, including advocates of the popular-national left-wing, social-liberals, Christian socialists, and

other left-wingers.' For many international observers the MSZP has now completed its reform into a social-democratic party. The party has about 36,000 members. It is well organised throughout the country having some 2,000 local party organisations.

Despite the positive role of the reformist and technocratic elites of the MSZMP during the Hungarian transformation, the MSZP only mustered 10.89% of the popular vote in the first free elections in the spring 1990, which translated into 33 of 394 seats. Four years later, a dramatic increase in support gave the party governmental responsibility with 32.96 per cent of the vote and 209 of 386 seats. The chairman of the party Gyula Horn became head of the coalition government (with the Alliance of Free Democrats – SZDSZ). László Kovács became Foreign minister.

In the elections of May 1998, despite maintaining its level of popular support (32.3), the party faced a decline of its parliamentary representation with 134 seats. Consequently, it lost governing responsibility. Following the resignation of Horn, Kovács was elected as party chairman. Since 2001, the non-partisan Péter Medgyessy, deputy prime minister in the last pre-transition government and minister of Finance between 1996 and 1998, has been prime minister candidate of the MSZP. He succeeded in winning the parliamentary elections in 2002 and formed a coalition government with SZDSZ.

address MSZP Köztársaság tér 26, 1081 Budapest, Hungary

Internet: www.mszp.hu

e-mail: info@mszp.hu

The Hungarian Social Democratic Party (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt – MSZDP) was founded in 1891. In January 1989 it was re-founded but has been weakened by continuous splits and the lack of a parliamentary presence. The present Chairperson is László Kapolyi.

address MSZDP: Hatház u. 5/A, 1106 Budapest, Hungary

Internet: www.szdp.hu

e-mail: szdp@hu.inter.net

The MSZP is a full member of the SI. The MSZDP has consultative status in the SI

Latvia

The Latvian Social Democratic Party (Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija, LSDP) was founded on April 14, 1990, after a split in the Latvian Communist Party (LKP), firstly as the Nationalist Latvian Communist Party and later as the Latvian Democratic Workers Party (LDDP). Originally a party with procommunist leanings and nationalist ideas, it was transformed into a social-democratic party by its leader Juris Bojars. The party co-operated with the LSDSP in the 1995 parliamentary elections (after which it changed its name to LSDP) and again in 1998.

Re-established in 1989 (maintaining continuity with the historic party)

the Latvian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Latvijas sociāldemokrātiskā strādnieku partija – LSDSP) was represented in parliament as part of the Popular Party between 1990 and 1993. From 0.66% of the vote in 1993, two years later, as part of an electoral coalition called 'Work and Justice', it just failed to pass the 5% threshold (4.6%). For the elections in October 1998, the two parties joined forces and presented a joint election list: the Latvian Social Democratic Alliance (Latvijas Sociāldemokrātu Apvienība, LSDA). This election coalition won 12.8% of the popular vote, and 14 seats in parliament, where it pledged support to the minority government of Kristopans in return for an emphasis on social security policies. The Alliance did not participate in the coalition. The presidential elections of 1999 showed major problems for the biggest government party Latvian Way – its candidate ended last. Vaira Vīke-Freiberga won the elections; she became the first female president in Central- and Eastern Europe. She was the joint candidate of, among others, the social democrats. For ten years since 1989 the LSDP had had three successive chairmen: Uldis Berzins, Janis Dinevics, and Arnis Mugurevics.

In May 1999, the merger of LSDP and LSDSP took place: the Social Democratic Worker's Party. The LSDSP delivered the name and the LSDP the party leader, Juris Bojars. The LSDP supported the Kristopans government in the Saeima. Following the disappointing presidential elections, Kristopans resigned and a new conservative-liberal government was formed. The LSDSP went into the opposition. Party member Guntars Bojars is Deputy Speaker of the Saeima.

In January 2002 five MP's of the LSDSP left the party in protest against the growing cooperation of LSDSP and the leftist For Human Rights in a United Latvia. In March they founded a new party: the Union of Social Democrats. Chairman is Egils Baldzens. In the October 2002 elections the LSDSP won just 4% of the vote and failed to win any seats in Parliament.

address LSDSP Bruninieku ieta 29/31, 1112 Riga, Latvia

Internet: www.lsdsp.lv

e-mail: lsdsp@lis.lv

The LSDSP is full member of the Socialist International.

Lithuania

Between 1990 and 1992 the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (Lietuvos Sociāldemokrātu Partija – LSDP), part of the Lithuanian Restructuring Movement (Sąjūdis), had 9 delegates in parliament. The 1992 general elections resulted in 8 seats, making the LSDP the third independent political force in parliament. In 1996 the party strengthened its position by passing the 5% threshold and gaining 12 seats in the Seimas. At that time the party had about 1100 members. The parliamentary party group was very active, taking responsibility for many legislative proposals. LSDP's initiatives were often supported by the LDDP (the former Communist Party). Until 2000 the LSDP

ruled out any form of co-operation with the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. For the October 2000 elections, however, both parties formed a coalition, led by the former Lithuanian president Algirdas Brazauskas who became prime minister. The joint participation in the parliamentary elections proved very successful: the social-democratic Coalition won 31,1% of the votes and 51 seats (of 141) in the Seimas. In 2001 a new government was formed after the collapse of an unstable coalition. The LSDP dominates the new government. On the insistence of the LSDP no formal coalition agreement has been signed. Instead the parties agreed to form what they called a 'majority of broad agreement'.

Chairperson of the LSDP is Vytenis Andriukaitis (since May 1999). The party is a full member of the Socialist International.
address Basanaviciaus 16/5, 2009 Vilnius, Lithuania
Internet: www.lsdp.lt

Lithuanian Party Social Democracy 2000 (Lietuvos partija 'Sociademokratija 2000', SD) is a split-off from the LSDP. It was established in December 1999 after a period of severe internal debates within the Social Democratic Party. The SD defines itself as a modern social-democratic party of western standards (Blair/Schröder). The party is neither represented in parliament, nor has it any SI-status. The party chairman is R. Dagys.
address www.socdem2000.lt

Macedonia

The Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (Sojaldemokratski Sojuz Makedonije – SDSM) is the successor of the League of Macedonian Communists (SKM) which renamed itself in 1991. It was established by Kiro Gligorov (president since 1990) and Branko Crvenovski (the head of government 1992-98). The latter is also chairman of the party.

In 1990, the party obtained 31 of 120 seats in parliament. Prior to the 1994 elections it formed a coalition with the Liberals called the Alliance for Macedonia in a bid to prevent nationalist movements from gaining power. The alliance gained 95 of the 120 parliamentary seats (in part due to the fact that the nationalists boycotted the second round). In government it was the main stronghold in favour of the independence of Macedonia. In the elections of October/November 1998 the SDSM won just 27 of 120 parliamentary seats thereby losing its governing responsibility to the right-centrist VMRO-DPMNE. The SDSM has a huge backing in the rural areas among the Slav Macedonians. Playing an important role in signing the August 2001 power-sharing peace agreement of Ohrid, the party strengthened its position as well. The party leader Branko Crvenovski has been participating in the government 'of national unity' which was formed in 2001 by VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, LP, LDP and others to 'serve as a platform against violence'. The agreement of Ohrid arranged for democratic elections after one year, so in September 2002. SDSM

became the big winner of these elections with 40% of the votes. To form a government a coalition-partner needs to be found. During the election campaign, Crvenkovski suggested that he would look for a coalition with the Albanian-speaking winner of the elections, to serve the stability of the country. This would mean now to form a government with Ali Ahmeti's Democratic Party of Integration, which won 12% i.e. 70% of the Albanian votes. The complication is that Ahmeti used to be a member of the former UCK and is seen as a 'terrorist' by SDSM voters. Crvenkovski is under pressure from the international community to co-operate with Ahmeti. It is unclear yet how Crvenkovski will solve this dilemma.

The SDSM has observer status in the Socialist International.
address Bihacka br. 8, 9100 Skopje, FYR of Macedonia

The Socialist Party of Macedonia (SP) also emerged from the League of Communists. The SP advocates privatisation with a human face and, like the SDSM, mainly draws its members from Slav Macedonian population. As part of a five party coalition it gained 2 seats in October/November 1998. In the elections of 2002 the Socialist Party won no seats.

Moldova

The Social Democratic Party of Moldova (Partidul Social Democrat din Moldova – PSDM) was founded in Chisinau on 13 May 1990. The party Chairman is Oazu Nantoi. The PSDM was Moldova's first parliamentary political party and endorses traditional social-democratic issues. Its members are mainly urban intellectuals. The party played quite an influential role during the 1992 formation of the government. In May 1993, at its first congress, the PSDM's current statute and programme were adopted. The party advocates Moldova's independence and the republic's statehood. The PSDM is the only political force consistently promoting the idea of civil society – as opposed to Moldova only being a state of co-habiting ethnic groups. Concerning the secessionist trans-Dniestr region the party has advocated the idea of a peaceful settlement. This point of view led to the resignation in 1992, from his office as president's councillor, of party leader Oazu Nantoi. On economic issues the PSDM is reformist. At the 1994, 1998 and 2001 parliamentary elections the social democrats were unable to pass the electoral threshold.

The party has observer status in the Socialist International.
address Str. Mihail Kogalniceanu 11, 2001 Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

The Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM) is the successor of the Movement For Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (MDMDP). It transformed itself in April 2000 from a pro-Lucinschi (the communist president) movement to an independent political party with social-democratic values. MDMDP used to hold ca 20% of the votes in Moldova, however DPM was only able to win 5% in the last elections in 2001. This was not enough to pass the 6% threshold. Recent-

ly the party came into contact with some Western European social-democratic parties. DPM has no relationship with the Socialist International. Party-leader is Dumitru Diacov.

address 32 Tighina street, 2001 Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
e-mail: mpmdp@moldova.md

Poland

The Democratic Left Alliance (Sojisz Lewicy Demokratycznej – SLD) emerged from the former communist party as well as its successor, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP). The SDRP won 60 out of 460 seats in the parliamentary elections of 1991. Under its leadership a number of left parties, political groupings, and trade unions merged in 1993 to form the Democratic Left Alliance electoral bloc. After the electoral victory in 1993, the SLD formed together with Polish Peasant Party (PSL) the government coalition. Until September 1997 it had been represented with 171 seats in parliament. In the September 1997 elections, despite increasing its share of the vote from 20.41 to 27.13% the number of SLD mandates fell to 164. The winner was the alliance of conservative forces Solidarnosc Electoral Action (AWS). In 1999 the SDRP was dissolved and the SLD was registered as a new political party. For the parliament elections on 23 June 2001 the SLD and the Labour Union (UP) presented a joint list that received almost 42% of the votes and secured 219 of 460 mandates in the Sejm. It formed a coalition government with the PSL, headed by SDL party chairman Leszek Miller as prime minister.

The Democratic Left Alliance advocates a market economy, strengthening of the local self-administration, promotion of the middle-class, modernisation of agriculture, and Poland's EU membership. Today the party has about 2,000 local organisations in all parts of the country and membership stands between 40-60,000.

The present president Aleksander Kwasniewski had been the SLD chairman for five years (he stood down after winning the presidential elections in 1995). The next party chairman Józef Oleksy was elected in the wake of spying allegations that had brought about his resignation as prime minister (for which he was subsequently exonerated). The current party leader is prime minister Leszek Miller.

address ul. Rozbrat 44a, 00419 Warszawa, Poland

Internet: www.sdrp.org.pl

e-mail: redakcja@sld.org.pl

The Union of Labour (Unia Pracy – UP) emerged in June 1992 from the left wing of the Solidarnosc movement (including Ryszard Bugaj's 'Labour Solidarity', which had 4 deputies, and the 'Democratic – Socialist Movement' of Zbigniew Bujak), as well as elements of, and numerous prominent individuals from the former communist party. In 1993, the party gained 41 of 460 mandates (7.3% of the vote). It was widely expected that the UP would have

formed a coalition with the SLD-PSL. Despite similar programmatic declarations, party leader Ryszard Bugaj, and his supporters remained opposed. Supporters of the idea, including Wojciech Lamentowicz, and much of the party base, argued that an active role in government was the most effective way to serve their constituents and offered a real opportunity to build for the future. In the parliamentary elections of 1997 the party failed to pass the 5% hurdle. Today its influence is in rapid decline. In the meantime, Bugaj and Bujak left the UP. Present chairman is Marek Pol.

For the elections in 2001, SLD and UP campaigned as a joined list which gained 216 of 460 seats of the Sejm. The parties formed a coalition government under premier Miller with the PSL.

address ul. Nowogrodzka 4, 000501 Warszawa, Poland

Internet: www.uniapracy.org.pl

e-mail: biuro@uniapracy.org.pl

In Poland both Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Union of Labour (UP) are full members of the Socialist International.

Romania

There were two parties in Romania which claimed to be social-democratic, the Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat, PD) and the Social Democratic Party of Romania (Partidul Social Democrat Roman, PSDR) which merged in June 2001 with the PSDR to form the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The PD's origin lay within the National Salvation Front (FSN). In the local elections in November 1991 the FSN split into the conservative Democratic National Salvation Front (FSND – the Illiescu wing) and the more reform oriented National Salvation Front (FSN – Petre Roman's wing), which went into opposition. The former subsequently, and cynically, renamed itself as the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR) while the latter united with the small Democratic Party – PD.

The National Salvation Front (FNS), won 43 of 343 parliamentary seats in 1992. On September 27, 1995 an agreement was signed between the PSDR and the PD to form the Social Democratic Union (Unianea Social Democrata – USD). This consisted of a political council, of equal representation from both sides which was designed to co-ordinate common political activities. In the elections of 1996 the USD gained 53 of 343 seats (15.5% of the vote – 43 seats for the PD and 10 for the PSDR). As a result of the elections of November 1996 a new government coalition was formed in Romania by the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) and the USD. In the autumn of 2000, the USD split up. The PD ran independently in the elections of 2000 and obtained 31 of 346 seats in the chamber of deputies.

address Aleea Modrogan nr. 1, sector 1, 70024 Buchuresti, Romania

Internet: www.pd.ro

e-mail: office@pd.ro

The Social Democratic Party of Romania (Partidul Social Democrat Roman, PSDR) considered itself to be the successor of the historic Social Democratic Party of Romania (1893). In 1992 it had 10 seats as part of the CDR. It remained too small to have a major impact on the political scene, but its identity, as a historical social-democratic party, soon became its major strength. This gave it the cultural capital which made it attractive for the PD. Although it has not increased its representation, as part of the USD it secured 10 seats in November 1996, it is much better placed to influence political developments. For the 2000 elections the PSDR became a part of the electoral alliance Democratic Social Pole of Romania consisting also of the post-communist PSDR and the PUR, Humanist Party of Romania. Thus the PSDR secured 7 mandates in parliament and the right to participate in the government. In June 2001 the PSDR and PDSR merged and formed a new party – the Party of Social Democracy (PSD). The chairman of the new party is Adrian Nastase. The PSD is dominated by the former PDSR.

address 10 Kiseleff Street, Buchuresti, Romania

Internet: www.psd.ro

e-mail: pdsr@pdsr.ro

The PD is a full member of the Socialist International. PSDR was a full member and the new party PSD is aiming at SI membership.

Russia

Russian social democracy remains highly fragmented and immature. Social-democratic tendencies are to be found within a number of parties or blocs. A good example for this is Yabloko which has been seen as including some strong social-democratic elements. Its political position now can be characterised rather as liberal oriented. Recently Yabloko was accepted as a full member in the Liberal International. There is no social-democratic party that has representatives in elected bodies in the Russian Federation, although some elected individuals have stated that they have a social-democratic orientation.

The Russian United Social Democratic Party (ROSDP) is the party of former president Michail Gorbachev. It was founded in March 2000 with the aim of uniting the several political parties, which claim to have true social-democratic principles. A constituent Congress to unite all these parties into the new Social Democratic Party of Russia (united) took place in November 2001 under the leadership of Gorbachev. It remains a question whether Gorbachev has enough popularity to become a real political player again. The newly formed party was able to register under the new law on political parties.

In June 2002 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Gennadi Zyuganov voted to expel from the party State Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev for refusing to abandon his leadership posts upon request of the party in April. A month later Seleznev announced that he intends to set up a

new social-democratic party. The party will be called Rossya Socialist Party.

The Russian political landscape is still volatile. Splits and splinters are daily news. This might change with the implementation of the new law on political parties. Under the new law only parties with a nation-wide organisation and substantial membership will have a future.

None of the above mentioned parties presently have an SI-status.

Slovakia

Both the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Socialnodemokraticka Strana Slovenska – SDSS) and the Party of the Democratic Left (Stranka Demokratickej Lavice – SDL) uphold the social-democratic mantle in Slovakia.

The SDSS re-established itself (claiming continuity with the historic Social Democratic Party of Slovakia) in February 1990. It was briefly led by Alexander Dubček until his death. Afterwards Jaroslav Volf became party chairman. Since June 2001, the party is led by Lubomir Slahor. Failing to pass the 4% hurdle in 1992, it gained two of 150 parliamentary seats in an alliance with the SDL, the Green Party, and the Movement of Farmers called Common Choice in 1994.

In September 1998 the SDSS as part of the five party alliance 'Slovak Democratic Coalition' (SDK) doubled its representation to 4. The SDK together with the SDL, the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) and the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) subsequently formed a coalition government.

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Internet: www.sdss.sk

The SDL is a post-communist party that has developed into a western-type social-democratic party. From 1990-1996 it was led by Peter Weiss. He was replaced by Josef Migas. In 1992, the party won 29 of 150 mandates in the parliamentary elections and as part of Common Choice, in 1994, 13 of 150 (10.40% of the vote) just managing to surpass the 10% threshold necessary for electoral coalitions at that time. Between March and October 1994 the party was part of the government coalition and held the offices of the vice prime minister (Brigita Schmögnerova) as well as the ministers of Economy, Defence and Justice. Participation, in some quarters of the party, was seen as a betrayal of, and by, its natural supporters. Prior to the 1994 elections it had lost a large faction that went on to form the Association for Slovak Workers (ZRS).

In September 1998, standing alone, the SDL managed to increase its share of the vote to 14.66% (23 seats) and a strong role in the new governing coalition. It took part in the grand government coalition, that encompassed all non-authoritarian parties of the Slovak parliament also including the party founded by the now Slovak president Schuster, the Party of Civil Under-

standing (SOP), which is also fighting for the centre-left voters. SDL politicians held the offices of the vice prime minister (L. Fogas) and ministers of Finance, Defence, Education, Social Affairs and Agriculture.

Since 2000, the SDL began to lose ground in the opinion polls and internal conflicts increased. Robert Fico left the SDL and founded SMER ('Direction') which also claims to be social-democratic and scored well in the opinion polls. SMER claims to be led by pragmatism and intends to create space for a new generation of politicians. It considers the establishment of order, justice and stability in Slovakia as its primary goal.

Decreasing support for SDL became apparent in the 2001 regional elections. In November 2001 elections for a new party leader took place. Incumbent chairman Jozef Migas did not stand. Pavel Koncos won the elections over Peter Weiss. This was seen as a victory of the more east-oriented part of SDL over the more European-oriented faction. In February 2002, Schmögnerova, minister of Finance, resigned after strong opposition by her own party-leadership to her policies. She and Peter Weiss left the SDL and founded the 'Social Democratic Alternative' (SDA).

SDL was completely swept away from the political scene in the elections of September 2002. The party only gained 1.4% of the votes. SDA did slightly better with 1.8%, but this was also far from passing the 5% threshold.

SMER became the third party of Slovakia, with 13% of the votes. This was less than predicted by the opinion-polls. It remains to be seen in the months to come whether SMER is indeed a social-democratic party.

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e-mail: sdl@sdl.sk

internet: www.sdl.sk/

address SMER Sumracna 27, 82102 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

internet: www.strana-smer.sk (EN)

e-mail: tajomnik@strana-smer.sk

Both the SDSS and SDL are full members of the Socialist International.

Slovenia

There are two parties in the Republic of Slovenia which claim to uphold the mantle of social democracy: The United List of the Social Democrats (Zdrvena Lista Socialnih Demokratov – ZLSD) and the Slovenian Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije – SDSS).

The ZLSD emerged from an electoral alliance of the reform communist Party of Democratic Revival (SDP) and the insignificant Social Democratic Union (SDU). Over time its support has declined from 17% of the vote in 1990; 13.6% in 1992 (14 of 90 mandates); dropping to 9.03% in 1996 (9 seats). ZLSD politician Milan Kucan became first president of independent Slovenia in 1990. Between 1992 and 1996 the ZLSD was part of the four party coalition that

formed the Slovenian government. During the elections in 2000, ZLSD obtained 3% more votes compared to the elections in 1996 (from 9 to 12%). A month later a new Slovenian government was formed and the ZLSD became one of four government coalition parties.

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In 1992, the SDS gained 4 seats with 3.3% of the votes, and until 1994 it was part of the four party coalition. In 1996 it witnessed a dramatic increase in its popular vote to 16.13% and 16 seats. A clear shift to the right was partly responsible for the rejection of its application for full membership of the SI which resulted in the party withdrawing from the Socialist International in 1996. In the 2000 elections the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia received 15.8% of the votes and secured 14 of 70 seats in parliament.

The United List of the Social Democrats (ZLSD) is presently a full member of the SI. The Slovenian Social Democratic Party (SDS) renounced its consultative membership of the SI in 1996 when the party was refused admission as full member of the organisation

Ukraine

Most Ukrainian political parties, even those which present themselves as social-democratic, remain dominated by key personalities and have not yet developed into mature organisations such as those in many western democracies. Being pro- or anti-president Kuchma is the main dividing line between the parties.

The Socialist Party of Ukraine (Sotsialitichna Partiya Ukrayini, SPU), chaired by Oleksandr Moroz, was formed in October 1991 as the actual successor of the former ruling Communist Party, but it chose to adopt its own programme and develop a new emphasis in its political activities. In the early stages the new strategy did not have any political impact. For the 1998 parliamentary elections, the SPU formed a coalition with the Peasant Party of Ukraine (PPU). The coalition stood for support for agriculture, raising the effectiveness of social programmes and the introduction of government control over strategic markets. The party lost its old ideological traits and opted for reform. The new programme underscored the need to carry out privatisation, implement changes to the tax and criminal codes, fight corruption and introduced a pro-Ukrainian foreign policy. During the presidential elections in 1999 competitions between two candidates within the SPU faction led to a split, and some deputies moved to other parties. The SPU calls itself democratic socialistic, but shows the signs of social democracy. SPU won 24 seats in the 2002 elections.

The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (Ukrainska Socialno-Demokraticzna Partija – USDP) claims continuity with the tradition of the Social-

Democratic Party founded in 1890 in the capital of Austria-Hungarian Galicia Lemberg (Lviv). The USDP was re-established in 1990. Between 1994 and 1998 the party was represented with four seats in the Ukrainian parliament. Now it does not have any representation to parliament. USDP and SPU intended to run on a joint list in the elections in 2002, but couldn't reach an agreement. USDP ran independently and was not able to win seats. Party chairman is Yuri Buzdugan.

The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (United) – Ukrainska Socilano-Democratischna Partija (O) was (re)established in 1995. The party is the successor of three other parties: the Social Democratic party of Ukraine, the Party of Human Rights, and the Ukrainian Party of Justice. It was created by former Justice minister Vasyl Onopenko. In the 1998 elections the SDPU(o) won 25 of 450 seats in parliament (now the SDPU(o) faction has 34 delegates). The party presents itself as moderate socialists and gained prominence when former prime minister Marchuk joined the party. Among the members of the SDPU(o) are former president Kravchuk as well as some leading representatives of the country's business community. The SDPU(o) is in general anti-presidential and shows, despite the name, no features of social democracy. The party won 24 seats in the 2002 elections. Party leader is Viktor V. Medvedchuk.

None of the above mentioned parties have institutionalised relations with the SI.

Yugoslavia

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consists of the two partial republics of Serbia and Montenegro. In both countries there are many independent party organisations, some of which proclaim a social-democratic identity.

The Social Democratic Union (Socijaldemokratska Unija, SDU), led by Zarko Korac, who is now Serbian deputy prime minister, was formed in May 1996 after a split in the Civic Alliance. For the 2000 elections, the SDU joined the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), the electoral alliance which won with 43.86% of the votes. The SDU is an anti-nationalist, social-democratic party. The SDU took a firm stance against nationalism and the war politics of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments. The SDU stood for a democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia, the respect of human and civil rights for all ethnic groups in FRY and Serbia, an ending of the violence in Kosovo, the inclusion of FRY into all international institutions, and full co-operation with the International Tribunal for War Crimes. The Social Democratic Union was strongly opposed to the regime of Milosevic, and saw the regime of Milosevic as solely responsible for all the wars in Yugoslavia, including the latest crisis in Kosovo. The SDU stood for integration into the international community as well as re-establishment of the relationship with the European Union, the Council of Europe, and NATO. The party was relatively smaller than other opposition parties.

Social Democracy (Socijaldemokratija, SD) was founded in 1997 by the former General of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Vuk Obradovic, who was the party chairman until the beginning of 2001. The SD's social-democratic ideology was sometimes obscured by nationalist tendencies. After Slobodan Orlic became the new party chairman, the SD declared its position definitely as anti-nationalistic. In the last parliamentary elections in 2000 it stood as part of the electoral coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. This cooperation of 18 democratically oriented opposition parties proved very successful: the DOS secured 58 out of 138 seats in parliament becoming thus the ruling political force in FYR. In April 2002 SDU and SD merged into the Social Democratic Party, SDP. The leaders of the founding parties, Slobdan Orlic and Zarko Korac, are party co-leaders of SDP in a transitional period after which a single party leader will be elected.

address Kralja Milana 23/1, Belgrade

internet: www.sdp.org.yu

The League of Social Democrats in Vojvodina (Liga Socijaldemokrata Vojvodine, LSV) is a multi-ethnic, anti-nationalist, anti-war, social-democratic party in Vojvodina. Since the founding of the party, the LSV has opposed all war efforts of the Serbian and Yugoslav government, has opposed discrimination on ethnic or any other ground. In fact, the LSV, and the SDU, are the only parties in Yugoslavia who over the years have openly criticised Serbian nationalism and the regime of Milosevic since its foundation. This is largely due to the flamboyant personality of its leader, Nenad Canak.

The LSV strives for an autonomous, multi-ethnic, and democratic Vojvodina, to be reached through decentralisation and 'denationalisation' of the Serbian state and the Yugoslav Federation. The party headquarters of the LSV is in Novi Sad, the biggest opposition city of Serbia, with a clear majority of democratic parties in the city council since the local elections of 1996. The LSV is a member of the Alliance of Democratic Parties and participated in the 2000 elections in the electoral alliance Democratic Opposition of Serbia. The LSV co-operates actively with the Social Democratic Party

address Trg mladaneca 10/11, 21000 Novi Sad

The Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (Socijaldemokratska Partija, SDP GG) was founded in 1993 after a merger of the Social Democratic Reform Party and the Socialist Party of Montenegro. The party is firmly anti-war oriented. It received 9.1% of the vote during the 1996 federal elections, and thus 1 of the 30 Montenegrin seats in Parliament. The SDP had opposed Milosevic till he was deprived of his power. It also strives for independence of Montenegro from Yugoslavia. The SDP as a part of the government coalition boycotted the last federal elections in 2000. Thus it did not get any seats in the federal parliament. It is represented now with 6 deputies in Montenegrin parliament.

Party's president is Zarko Rakcevic.

address Jovana Tomasevica bb, 81000 Podgorica, Montenegro.

internet: www.sdp.cg.yu

e-mail: sdp@cg.yu

The Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socialista, DPS) is the successor of the former League of Communists. DPS boycotted the federal elections in 2000, but has 30 seats in the Montenegrin Parliament. DPS is the leading party in the Montenegrin government formed by DPS, SDP and the liberals LS. Its party president Milo Djukanovic is also the president of the Republic of Montenegro.

address Jovana Tomasevica, Podgorica

internet: www.dps.cg.yu

It is also worth mentioning that the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, DS) which is represented in the Yugoslav Parliament with 26 seats leans towards social-democratic values. At the last party congress the DS passed a new programme which includes some crucial points of the social-democratic policy. The conclusive ideological formation of the party has not been yet accomplished.

The party chairman is Zoran Djindjic. Djindjic is one of the driving forces of DOS.

address Proleterskih brigada 69, 11000 Beograd

The Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP GG) is a consultative member of the Socialist International.

Annexes 2

Elections and Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe

The following tables give an overview over the results of the free elections in Central and Eastern Europe between 1990 and August 2002. The last included elections have been the Hungarian and Czech elections of spring 2002 while the elections in Macedonia, Slovakia, and Latvia occurred after the editorial deadline of this book. We have chosen the resulting distribution of seats in the newly elected parliaments rather than the votes casted. The results are presented country by country.

Some countries and some elections have been omitted for various reasons: Azerbaijan because of its lack of truly free elections. The federal elections in Czechoslovakia in 1990 and 1992 because of the termination of the Czechoslovak Federation and the rather complex set of different chambers. The results of the 1992 elections have been partially included in the respective tables for Czechia and Slovakia. You may find the complete results of the Czechoslovak elections in our first book "Troubled Transition" on p.142.

For each country we give also some basic structural data and information. The first two tables summarise and compile the country results using the results of the latest election (last column). We have tried to put a political label on the parties represented in parliament. These labels are somewhat arguable as affiliations party identities change and develop. For this purpose we have used the following categories and their respective abbreviations:

Abbreviations: C communist, P post-communist/authoritarian socialist, S social-democratic, L conservative/liberal, N nationalist/authoritarian, E ethnic/regionalist, M miscellaneous/non-partisans, V vacant

According to our subject we tried to differentiate more within the spectrum of the left than elsewhere. As some parties transform and reform themselves from communist (C) to post-communist (P), or from post-communist to social-democratic (S), the chosen labels are wrong for some periods.

The tables are based on the original tables of our first book *Troubled Transition*. Those tables were prepared by Hana-Joachim Strewé. The present versions are the result of additional work by Nadezda Redrikova, Annika Hennl, Benjamin Schlamp, Liesbeth van de Grift, Felix Dauderstädt, Irma Hesp and Kirsten Meijer.

The composition of parliaments (number of seats per political/ideological current)
as of 01-09-2002

	C	P	S	L	N	E	M	vacant	total
Albania	73	4	58		3	2	140		
Armenia	11		9	74			37		131
Belarus	6	5	2	1	83	13	110		
Bosnia-Herzegovina		1	10	4	16	6	5		42
Bulgaria		48		171		21			240
Croatia		45	45	4	55	8		157	
Czechia	41		70	89					200
Estonia		17	60	18	6			101	
Georgia			147		76	16		239	
Hungary			178	208					386
Latvia		14	69	17				100	
Lithuania			51	84	1	2	3		141
Macedonia		2	29	17	46	26			120
Moldova	71			30					101
Poland		216	151	91	2			460	
Romania		155	31	30	84	46			346
Russia	113	1		195	17		110		436
Slovakia			27	51	57	15			150
Slovenia			11	59	18	2			90
Ukraine	66	47		242			95		450
Yugoslavia									138
Serbia		44		58	5	1			108
Montenegro				30					30
Total	308	376	712	1874	375	261	359	13	4278

The composition of parliaments (percentage of seats per political/ideological current)
as of 01-09-2002

	C	P	S	L	N	E	M	vacant
Albania		52.1	2.9	41.4		2.1	1.4	
Armenia	8.3		6.9	56.5			28.2	
Belarus	5.5	4.5		1.8	0.9		75.5	11.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina		2.4	23.8	9.5	38.1	14.3	11.9	
Bulgaria		20.0		71.3		8.8		
Croatia			28.7	28.7	2.5	35.0	5.1	
Czechia 20.5		35.0	44.5					
Estonia			16.8	59.4	17.8	5.9		
Georgia				61.5		31.8	6.7	
Hungary			46.1	53.9				
Latvia			14.0	69.0	17.0			
Lithuania			36.2	59.6	0.7	1.4	2.1	
Macedonia		1.7	24.2	14.2	38.3	21.7		
Moldova	70.3			29.7				
Poland			47.0	32.8	19.8	0.4		
Romania			44.8	9.0	8.7	24.3	13.3	
Russia	25.9	0.2		44.7	3.9		25	
Slovakia			18.0	34.0	38.0	10.0		
Slovenia			12.2	65.6	20.0	2.2		
Ukraine	14.7	10.4		53.8			21.1	
Yugoslavia								
Serbia		40.7		53.8	4.6	0.9		
Montenegro				100.0				
total	7.2	8.8	16.6	43.8	8.8	6.1	8.4	0.3

Albania

Republic of Albania / Southeast Europe / total area 29,000 sq.km / pop. 3.2 m. / Capital: Tirana / Constitution of 1991 / New Constitution promulgated and ratified by referendum 1998 / People's Assembly (Since 1997)
155 MPs - 4 years / 125 (single-seat constituencies) 40 (Proportional Representation)

	31.03./07.04.91		22.03./29.03.92		26.05./02.06./16.06.96		29.06./06.07.97		24.06.2001		
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%	
Socialist Party of Albania PSSH	P	168	67.2%	38	27.1%	10	7.1%	101	65.2%	73	52.1%
Democratic Party of Albania PDSH ¹	L	75	30.0%	92	65.7%	120	85.7%	29	18.7%	Union for Victory	
Union for Victory BF ²	L									46	32.8%
Democratic Party PD	L									6	4.3%
Social Democratic Party	S			7	5.0%			8	2.5%	4	2.9%
of Albania PSDS											
Party of the Democratic	L							2	1.3%	3	2.1%
Alliance of Albania PADS											
Albanian Agrarian Party PAS	L							1	0.6%	3	2.1%
Human Right's Unity Party PBDN*	E	5	2.0%	2	1.4%	3	2.1%	4	2.6%	3	2.1%
Republican Party of Albania PRSH ¹	L			1	0.7%	3	2.1%	1	0.6%	Union for Victory	
Party of National Unity PUK	N							1	0.6%		
National Front BK ²	N					1	0.7%	3	1.9%	Union for Victory	
Non-partisans	M	2	0.8%			3	2.1%			2	1.4%
total		250	100.0%	140	100.0%	140	100.0%	155	100.0%	140	100.0%

* Greek Minority, ° = Monarchists, ¹ coalition Union for Victory (BF); Democratic party of Albania, Party of the Albanian National Front, Republican Party, Movement of Legality Party, Liberal Democratic Union

Armenia

Republic of Armenia / Anterior Asia (Trans Caucasus) / total area 30,000 sq.km / pop. 3.8 m. / Capital: Erevan / Constitution of 1995 / Parliament - 190 MP - 4 years / 150 single-seat; 40 PR

	05.07.1995/29.07.1995		30.05.1999		
	seats	%	seats	%	
Alliance Misantun (Unity) (Republican Party of Armenia	L		55	42.0%	
+ People's Party of Armenia HZHK)					
Law and Unity IM	L		6	4.6%	
Rule of Law Country OE	L		6	4.6%	
Republican Bloc	L				
Armenian National Movement	L		1	0.8%	
Democratic-Liberal Party					
Christ-Democratic Union					
Republican Party HHK ^o					
Council of Intellectuals					
Social-Democratic Party					
Non-partisans (close to Government)	M				
Non-partisans	M		32	24.4%	
Woman's Party Shamiram	L				
Communist Party HKK	C		11	8.4%	
National-Democratic Union of Armenia AZHM	L		6	4.6%	
Union for National Self-Determination	L				
Liberal-Democratic Party	L				
Scientific-Intellectual Citizens' Union	L				
Armenian Socialist Party ARF Dashnak	S		9	6.9%	
vacant	V		2	1.1%	
others	M		5	3.8%	
total		190	100.0%	131	100.0%

^o 1999 part of the Unity election bloc

Belarus

Republic of Belarus / Eastern Europe / total area 207,000 sq.km / pop. 10.0 m. / Capital: Minsk / Constitution of 1994 / 1996 / House of Representatives – 110 MPs – 4 years (and Council of the Republic???)

	14.05./28.05./29.11./10.12.1995		15.10./29.10.2000	
	seats	%	seats	%
Communist Party of Belarus KPB	42	16.2%	6	5.5%
Agrarian Party APB	33	12.7%	5	4.5%
Party of National Concord	8	3.1%		
Republican Party of Labour and Justice RPPS			2	1.8%
Liberal Democratic Party LDP			1	0.9%
United Democratic Party ^o	5	1.9%		
Party of Belorussian Unity	2	0.8%		
Belarusian Socialist Sporting Party SSP			1	0.9%
Social Democratic Party of Popular Accord SDPNZ			1	0.9%
United Citizens' Party	2	0.8%		
Gramada	1	0.4%		
9 Groups, in total	9	3.5%		
Non-partisans	96	36.9%	81	73.6%
vacant	62	23.8%	13	11.8%
total	260	100.0%	110	100.0%

^o = in October 1995 merged with the Civic Party to the United Civic (Citizen's) Party

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Bosnia and Herzegovina

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina / Southeast Europe / total area 51,000 sq.km / pop. 4.40 m. / Capital: Sarajevo / Constitution of 1995 / Republican Parliament House of Representatives – 42 MPs – 2 years; House of the People's – 35 MPs – / Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – House of Representatives of the Federation – 140 members – 2 years; House of the People's 50 percent Bosnian and Croatian representation; National Assembly of the Serbian Republic – 83 MPs – 2 years;

	18.01.90		14.09.96		12/13.09.98/11.11.2000	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Party of Democratic Action SDA (Muslims)	41	31.5%	19	45.2%	17	40.5%
Sloga Coalition					4	9.5%
Serb Democratic Party SDS	34	26.2%	9	21.4%	4	9.5%
Croatian Democratic Community HDZ (Croatsians)	20	15.4%	8	19.0%	6	14.3%
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina SDP BiH			1	2.4%	4	9.5%
Union of Bosnian Social Democrats UBSD	1	2.4%	2	4.8%		
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina SbiH			2	4.8%	4	9.5%
People's Union for Peace NSSM			2	4.8%		
Party for Democratic Progress RS PDP			2	4.8%		
SNSD-DSP*						
Socialist Party RS SPRS						
Serbian People's Union RS SNS						
New Croatian Initiative NHI						
Democratic People's Community DNZ						
Bosnian-Herzegovinan Patriotic Party BPS						
Democratic Party of Pensioners BiH DSPBiH						
miscellaneous	35	26.9%			5	11.9%
total	130	100.0%	42	100.0%	42	100.0%

* Party of Independent Social Democrats and Democratic Socialist Party

99

Bulgaria

Republic of Bulgaria / Southeast Europe / total area 111,000 sq.km / pop. 8.4 m. / Capital: Sofia / Constitution of 1991 / National Assembly – 240 MPs – 4 years / 240 PR

Elections:	10.06.90/27.06.90	13.10.91	18.12.94	19.04.97	18.06.01
	seats %	seats %	seats %	seats %	seats %
National Movement Simeon the Second L					
NDSII					
Bulgarian Socialist Party BSP (Coalition for Bulgaria) ¹ KzB	P 211 52.8%	106 44.2%	125 52.1%	58 24.2%	48 20%
United Democratic Forces ODS ^o	L 144 36.0%	110 45.8%	69 28.8%	137 57.1%	51 21.25%
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Turkish and Muslim Minority) DPS ²	E 23 5.8%	24 10.0%	15 6.3%	ONS	21 8.75%
Union for National Salvation ONS ³	E				
People's Union NS ^o	L 16 8.0%			19 7.9%	
Bulgarian Business Block BBB	N			ODS	
Coalition Euro-Left EL	S			12 5.0%	
miscellaneous	M 20 5.0%			14 5.8%	
Non-partisans	M 2 0.5%				
total	400 100.0%	240 100.0%	240 100.0%	240 100.0%	240 100.0%

^o 1997: Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) 123 seats, People's Union (NS) 24 seats, Agrarian People's Union (BZNS-NS) 7 seats, Social Democratic Party (BSP) 2 seats, Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organisation (VMRO) 1 seat
 1 2001 a broad pre-election coalition of 15 parties, the dominant role played the BSP

2 1997 part of Union for National Salvation ONS, 2001 formed coalition with Liberal Union and EuroRoma

3 DPS 15 seats, monarchist and centrist groups 4 seats

Croatia

Republic of Croatia / Southeast Europe / total area 57,000 sq.km / pop. 4.8 m. / Capital: Zagreb / Constitution of 1990/1993 / House of Representatives – up to 160 MPs – 4 years – / 28 single seat; 80 PR; number of seats for the Croatian Diaspora depends on number of Croats abroad who vote; 7 ethnic minorities / Chamber of Districts – 68 members of which 5 appointed

Elections:	02.08.92	29.10.95	4.03.00
	seats %	seats %	seats %
Croatian Democratic Community HDZ	E 85 63.9%	75 59.1%	46 29.3%
Social Democratic Party of Croatia SDP	S 11 8.3%	10 7.9%	44 28.0%
Croatian Social Liberal Party HSLS	L 14 10.5%	12 9.4%	24 15.3%
Joint List ZL:			
Croatian Peasant Party HSS	L 15 11.3%	18 14.2%	16 10.2%
Istrian Democratic Assembly IDS	E		4 2.5%
Croatian People's Party HNS	L		2 1.3%
Slavonian-Baranian Croatian Party SBHS	E		1 0.6%
Croatian Right's Party HSP	N	4 3.1%	4 2.5%
Croatian Christian Democratic Union HKDU	L		1 0.6%
Croatian Independent Democrats HND	L	1 0.8%	
Croatian Social Democrat's Action ASH	S	1 0.8%	1 0.6%
Serbian National Party SNS	E	2 1.6%	1 0.6%
Non-partisan representatives minorities	M	5 3.8%	2 1.3%
Representatives Croats abroad	M		6 3.8%
Littoral and Highland Region Alliance PGS	E		2 1.3%
Liberal Party LS	L		2 1.3%
Hungarian Democratic Community of Croatia	E		1 0.6%
miscellaneous	M	3 2.3%	
total	133 100.0%	127 100.0%	157 100.0%

Czechia

Czech Republic / Central Europe / total area 79,000 sq.km / pop. 10.3 m. / Capital: Prague / Constitution of 1993/1995 / Chamber of Representatives – 200 MPs PR – 4 years / Senate – 81 MPs – 6 years (one third every two years)

Elections	08./09.1990	05.06./06.06.1992	31.05./01.06.1996	19.06./20.06.1998	14.06./15.06.2002
1992 still in the former CSFR:	seats %	seats %	seats %	seats %	seats %
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia C	32 16.0%	35 17.5%	22 11.0%	24 12.0%	41 20.5%
KSCM					
Czech Social Democratic Party CSSD	S	16 8.0%	61 30.5%	74 37.0%	70 35%
Civic Forum OF	L 123 61.5%				
Liberal Democratic Party LDS	L 4 2.0%				
Civic Democratic Party ODS	L	76 38.0%	68 34.0%	63 31.5%	58 29%
Civic Democratic Alliance ODA	L	14 7.0%	13 6.5%		
Christian and Democratic Union	L	15 7.5%	18 9.0%	20 10.0%	22 11%
Czechoslovak People's Party KDU/CSL					
Liberal-Social Union LSU	L	16 8.0%		19 9.5%	9 4.5%
Freedom Union US	L				
Rally for the Republic/					
Czechoslovak Republican Party SPR/RSC	N	14 7.0%	18 9.0%		
Society for Moravia and Silesia HSD-SMS	E	14 7.0%			
total	200 100.0%	200 100.0%	200 100.0%	200 100.0%	200 100.0%

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Estonia

Republic of Estonia / Northeast Europe / total area 45,000 sq.km / pop. 1.5 m. / Capital: Tallinn / Constitution of 1992 / State Council – 101 MPs (PR) – 4 years

Elections:	20.09.92	05.03.95	7.03.99
	seats %	seats %	seats %
National Coalition Party Fatherland I	N 28 27.7%	7 6.9%	18 17.8%
Coalition Party and Rural Union KÕU	L 18 17.8%	41 40.6%	7 6.9%
People's Front	L 16 15.8%		
Moderates: Estonian Rural Centre Party EMK			
Estonian Social Democratic Party ESDP ¹	S 12 11.9%	6 5.9%	17 16.8%
National Independence Party	L 10 9.9%		
Citizen's Alliance	L 8 7.9%		
Royalists	M 8 7.9%		
miscellaneous	M 1 1.0%		
Estonian Reform Party RE	L 19 18.8%		18 17.8%
Estonian People's Party EME	L 7 -		7 6.9%
Estonian Centre Party EK	L 17 16.8%		28 27.7%
Our Home is Estonia NDE (Russian Minority)	E 6 5.9%		6 5.9%
Estonian United People's Party EÜRP (Russian Minority)	E		
Republican and Conservative People's Party VKR	L 5 5.0%		
Russian Party in Estonia VEE (Russian Minority)	E		
Farmer's Assembly PK	L		
Progress Party AP ²	L		
total	101 100.0%	101 100.0%	101 100.0%

1.1999 both parties merged. United party is called Mõõdukad.

2.1996 the party split from the Centre Party

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Georgia

Republic of Georgia / Anterior Asia (Trans Caucasus) / total area 68,000 sq.km / pop. 5.4 m. / Capital: Tbilisi / Constitution of 1995 / Upper Council – 335 MPs – 4 years 85 Single Seat; 150 PR

Elections:	11.10.92		05.11/19.11.95/ 05.02.96		31.10/14.11.1999	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Block "Unity"	14	6.0%				
Block "October 11th."	18	77%				
Block "Peace"	29	12.3%				
Green Party	11	4.7%				
18 Groups, in total	64	27.2%				
National- Democratic Party EDP	33	5.5%	34	14.5%		
Citizens' Union of Georgia SMK			107	45.5%	130	54.4%
People's Party						
All-Georgian Union for Revival (Adjarian Minority) / Revival of Georgia*			29	12.3%	64	26.8%
Industry Will Save Georgia IWSG						
Georgian Labour Party Shromis					15	6.2%
Lion All-Georgian Political Association LEMl (Swan Minority)					2	0.8%
Solidarity Block T (Pro Russian)						
Socialist Party of Georgia SSP ^o						
Block Progress P						
Reformers' Union of Georgia – National Concord SPK-ET						
Union of Georgian Traditionalists KTK*						
Communist Party of Georgia SKP						
Non-partisans	76	32.3%	45	19.1%	16	6.7%
Abkhazian delegates	10	4.3%	6	2.6%		
total	235	100.0%	235	100.0%	239	100.0%

^o = 1999 was a part of election coalition political bloc Revival of Georgia* = the electoral bloc Revival of Georgia was formed in 1999 by Abashidze's Revival Party (Adjarian Minority), the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, the Socialist Party of Georgia, and a group of supporters of the former president Gamsakhurdia.

Hungary

Republic of Hungary / Central Europe / total area 93,000 sq.km / pop. 10.2 m. / Capital: Budapest / Constitution of 1949/1989 / National Assembly – 386 MPs – 4 years / 176 Single-seat; 200 PR

Elections:	25.03/04.04.1990		08.05/29.05.1994		10.05/24.05.1998		7.04/21.04.2002	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Hungarian Socialist Party MSzP	33	8.5%	209	54.1%	134	34.7%	178	46.1%
Hungarian Democratic Forum MDF*	164	42.5%	37	9.6%	17	4.4%	24	6.2%
Alliance of Free Democrats SzDSz	92	23.8%	70	18.1%	24	6.2%	20	5.2%
Independent Party of Smallholders FKgP	44	11.4%	26	6.7%	48	12.4%		
Christian-Democratic People's Party KDNP	21	5.4%	22	5.7%				
Alliance of Young Democrats FIDESZ*	21	5.4%	20	5.2%	148	38.3%	164	42.5%
Agrarian Alliance ASZ	1	0.3%	1	0.3%				
Hungarian Truth and Life Party MIEP					14	3.6%		
Non-partisans	6	1.6%			1	0.3%		
Multi-Party MP's	4	1.0%						
miscellaneous			1	0.3%				
total	386	100.0%	386	100.0%	386	100.0%	386	100.0%

* Coalition in 2002

Latvia

Republic of Latvia / Northeast Europe / total area 65,000 sq.km / pop. 2.5 m. / Capital: Riga / Constitution of 1993 (1922) / Saeima - 100 MP - 3 years PR

Elections:	05.06./06.06.1993		30.09./01.10.1995		03.10.1998	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Latvian Socialist Party LSP	7	7.0%	6	6.0%		
Latvian Social Democratic Union LSDA					14	14.0%
Latvian Christian-Democratic Union LKDS	6	6.0%				
Democratic Centre Party	5	5.0%				
Union Latvia's Way LC	36	36.0%	17	17.0%	21	21.0%
Latvian National Conservative Party LNNK	15	15.0%	8	8.0%		
Democratic Party "Master" DPS			18	18.0%		
Latvian Farmer's Union LZS	12	12.0%	7	7.0%		
Popular Concord Party TSP	13	13.0%	6	6.0%	16	16.0%
New Party JP					8	8.0%
People's Party TP					24	24.0%
Fatherland and Freedom TB*	6	6.0%	14	14.0%	17	17.0%
Popular Movement for Latvia TKL			16	16.0%		
Latvian Unity Party LVP			8	8.0%		
total	100	100.0%	100	100.0%	100	100.0%

* = 1998: TB and LNNK

Lithuania

Republic of Lithuania / Northeast Europe / total area 65,000 sq.km / pop. 3.7 m. / Capital: Vilnius / Constitution of 1992 / Seimas - 141 MPs - 4 years 70 Single-seat; 70 PR

Elections:	25.10./15.11.92		20.10./10.11.96		8.10.00	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Homeland Union - Conservatives of Lithuania TS-LK	28	19.9%	70	49.6%	9	6.4%
A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition ^o	5				51	36.2%
New Union NS					29	20.6%
Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party LKDP	16	11.3%	16	11.3%	2	1.4%
Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania LDDP ^o	73	51.8%	12	8.5%		
Centre Union of Lithuania LCJ	2	1.4%	13	9.2%	2	1.4%
Social-Democratic Party of Lithuania LSDP ^o	8	5.7%	12	8.5%		
Lithuanian Democratic Party LDP	4	2.8%	2	1.4%		
Election Action of Lithuania's Poles LLRA	4	2.8%	2	1.4%	2	1.4%
Non-partisans	1	0.7%	4	2.8%	3	2.1%
Christian-Democratic Union KDS			1	0.7%	1	0.7%
Lithuanian National Union LTS			1	0.7%		
Lithuanian Liberal Union LLS			1	0.7%	34	24.1%
Lithuanian Peasant Party LVP			1	0.7%	4	2.8%
Lithuanian Freedom Union LLS					1	0.7%
Lithuanian National Party "Young Lithuania"			1	0.7%		
Lithuanian Party Social Democracy 2000 SD 2000						
Modern Christian Democratic Union MKDS					1	0.7%
Lithuanian Woman's Party LMP			1	0.7%		
Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Deportees LPKTS /			1	0.7%		
"New Lithuania" Union of New Nationalists and						
Political Prisoners JL/N7PKS						
Moderate Conservative Union NKS					1	0.7%
miscellaneous			5	3.5%	3	2.1%
total	141	100.0%	141	100.0%	141	100.0%

^o = 2000 the coalition consists of the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDDP), the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), the New Democratic Party (NDP), and Lithuanian Russian Union (LRS)

Macedonia

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Republic of Macedonia / Southeast Europe / total area 26,000 sq.km / pop. 2.1 m. / Capital: Skopje / Constitution of 1991 / Assembly - 120 MPs - 4 years / 85 single-seat; 35 PR

	11.11./25.11./09.12.90	16.10./30.10.94	18.10./02.11.98
	seats %	seats %	seats %
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization VMRO	38 31.7%		46 38.3%
Democratic Alternative			13 10.8%
Social Democratic League of Macedonia SDSM	31 25.8%	58 48.3%	29 24.2
Socialist Party of Macedonia SPM	5 4.2%	9 7.5%	2 1.7%
Liberal Party LP	18 15.0%	29 24.2%	4 3.3%
Democratic Party of Macedonia DPM		1 0.8%	
Social Democratic Party of Macedonia SDPM		1 0.8%	
Democratic Prosperity Party PDP (Albanian Minority)		10 8.3%	14 11.7%
People's Democratic Party NDP (Albanian Minority)	17 14.2%		11 9.2%
Union of Roma in Macedonia SRM (Roma minority)	5 4.2%	4 3.3%	1 0.8%
Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia (Turkish Minority) DPTM		1 0.8%	
Party for Democratic Action/Islamic Path (Islamist) PDA		1 0.8%	
Non-partisan	3 2.5%		
miscellaneous	3 2.5%	5 4.2%	
total	120 100.0%	120 100.0%	120 100.0%

Moldova

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Republic of Moldova / Southeast Europe / total area 34,000 sq.km / pop. 4.3 m. / Capital: Chisinau / Constitution of 1994 / Parliament - 104 MPs - 4 years / 104 PR

	27.02.94	22.03.98	25.02.01
	seats %	seats %	seats %
Agrarian-Democratic Party of Moldova PDAM	56 53.8%		19 18.8%
Electoral Bloc Braghis Alliance ³ BEAB			
Socialist Party PS ¹	28 26.9%		
Congress of Intellectuals Cj/Alliance of Free Farmers ATL/ National Liberal Party PNL ²	11 10.6%		
Party of Democratic Forces PFD		11 10.9%	
Christian Democratic People's Front FPFD ³	9 8.7%		11 10.9%
Democratic Convention of Moldova CDM		26 25.7%	
Block for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova PMDP		24 23.8%	
Communist Party of Moldova PCRM		40 39.6%	71 70.3%
Total	104 100.0%	101 100.0%	101 100.0%

1 2001: Electoral Bloc Braghis Alliance: Social-Political Movement New Force, Professionals Movement Hope, Socialist Party, Labour Union, Centrist Union, Party of Social Democracy Ant

2 1998: PFD

3 1998: CDM¹ = 2001: the party is called Christian Democratic People's Party FPFD; * = Pro-Romanian

Poland

Republic of Poland / Central Europe / total area 313,000 sq.km / pop.38.6 m. / Capital: Warsaw / Constitution of 1997 / Sejm - 460 MPs - 4 years (and Senate) 391 PR; 69 distributed to the those receiving 7+ percent.
Senate: 100 seats (First-past-the-post)

Elections	71.10.91	19.03.93	21.09.97	23.09.01
	seats	seats	seats	seats
Democratic Union UD Union of Freedom (UW) since 1994	L 62	13.5%	74	16.1%
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) + Union of Labour (UP)	S 60	13.0%	171	37.2%
Citizens' Platform PO	L			
Catholic Action/Fatherland WAK	L 49	10.7%		
Trade Union Solidarnosc	L 27	5.9%		
Polish People's Party (agrarian) PSL	L 48	10.4%	27	5.9%
Self Defence of the Polish Republic S	N			
Law and Justice PIS	L			
League of Polish Families LPR	N			
Confederation for an Independent Poland KPN	L 46	10.0%	22	4.8%
Centre Alliance POC	L 44	9.6%		
Liberal Democratic Congress KLD	L 37	8.0%		
Peasants' Alliance LS	L 28	6.1%		
Beer Lovers of Poland PPPP	M 16	3.5%		
Union for Political Realism UPR	L 3	0.7%		
Party X	N 3	0.7%		
Union of Labour UP	S 4	0.9%	41	8.9%
miscellaneous	M 26	5.7%		
Non-partisan Block for Support of Reforms: BBWR	L			
Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland ROP*	L			
Solidarnosc Electoral Action AWS	L 7	1.5%	201	43.7%
German Minority MN	E		2	0.4%
total	460	100.0%	460	100.0%

* = 2001: the ROP was on the joint list of the Solidarnosc Electoral Action (AWS)

Romania

Romania / Southeast Europe / total area 238,000 sq.km / pop. 23.0 m. / Capital: Bucharest / Constitution of 1991 / Chamber of Deputies - 343 MPs - 4 years 328 PR; 15 ethnic minorities Senate - 143 Senators - 4 years (PR)

Elections	27.09.92	03.11.96	26.11.00	
	seats	seats	seats	
Democratic Convention of Romania CDR ²	L 82	23.9%	122	35.6%
National Farmers' Party/Christian and Democratic PNT-CD ²				
National Liberal Party PNL	L			
National Liberal Party - Christian Democrats PNL-CD				
Romanian Alternative Party PAR				
Romanian Ecological Party PER				
Ecologist Federation of Romania FER ²				
Democratic Social Pole of Romania ¹	P			
Humanist Party of Romania PUR ³				
Democratic Social Party of Romania PDSR* ¹	P 117	34.1%	91	26.5%
Socialist Labour Party PSM	P 13	3.8%		
Social Democratic Union USD	S 43	12.5%	53	15.5%
Democratic Party PD ^o				
Romanian Social Democratic Party PSDR ¹	S			
Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania UDMR	E 27	7.9%	25	7.3%
National Minorities	E 15	4.4%	15	4.4%
Party of Great Romania PMR	N 16	4.7%	19	5.5%
Romanian National Unity Party PUNR ³	N 30	8.7%	18	5.2%
total	343	100.0%	343	100.0%

^o = 1992: Democratic Front for National Salvation (FDNS); * = 1992: Front for National Salvation (FNS); ¹ = 2000 electoral bloc consisting of Democratic Social Party of Romania (PDSR), Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR), and Human Party of Romania (PUR); ² = 2000: Democratic Convention of Romania 2000 included 5 smaller parties, among them PNT and FER; ³ = 2000: National Alliance Party (PUNR-PNR)

Russia

Russian Federation / Eastern Europe/Northern Asia / total area 17,000,000 sq.km / pop. 148.0 m. / Capital: Moscow / Constitution of 1993 / State Duma - 450 MPs - 4 years 225 single-seat; 225 PR Federation Council - 178 members - 2 from each region

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Elections:

	12.12.93	17.12.95	19.12.99
	seats	seats	seats
	%	%	%
Communist Party of the Russian Federation KPRF	65	158	113
Inter-Regional Movement Unity (MEDVED)		14.4%	35.1%
Agrarian Party of Russia APR	47	20	72
Union of Right Forces SPS ^o		10.4%	16.5%
Power to the People VN			29
Fatherland All Russia OVR		9	66
Congress of Russian Communities and Mov. of Y.Boldurev KRO-DYB		5	1
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Bloc of Zhirinovskiy) LDPR	70	51	17
Block of Stanislav Govorukhin BSG		1	
Women of Russia ZR		3	
Block of Ivan Rybkin BIR *	25	3	
Block of Independents		3	
Our Home is Russia MDR		1	
Apple Yabloko	33	55	7
Russia's Democratic Choice DVR ^o	96	45	21
Forward Russia VR		9	
Pamfilo-Gurov-Vladimir Lyсенko PCL		3	
89 - 89 Regions of Russia 89		2	
Trade Unions... PPR-St		1	
My Fatherland MO		1	
Common Cause OD ^o		1	
			7
			1.6%
			4.8%

Party of Workers' Self Government PST

Transformation of the Fatherland PO

Party of Russian Unity a. Concord PRES

Party of Economic Freedom PES

All-Russian Political Movement in Support the Army DPA

Russian Socialist Party RSP

Pensioners' Party PP

miscellaneous

Non-partisans

total

			2	0.5%
			1	0.2%
			1	0.2%
			1	0.2%
			1	0.2%
			87	19.3%
			27	6.0%
			450	100.0%
			77	17.1%
			436	100.0%

^o = 1999 coalition of small parties united around the Democratic Choice of Russia (DVR)

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Slovakia

Slovak Republic / Central Europe / total area 49,000 sq.km / pop 5.4 m. / Capital: Bratislava / Constitution of 1993 / National Council - 150 MPs - 4 years PR

Elections (1992 still in the former CSFR):

	08./09.06.1990	05./06.06.1992	30.09./02.10.1994	25./16.09.1998
	seats	seats	seats	seats
	%	%	%	%
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia HZDS				
Slovak National Party SNS	N	74	61	43
Communist Party of Slovakia KSS	N	15	9	14
Slovak Worker's Front ZRS	C			
Party of the Hungarian Coalition SMK	C		13	
Party of Democratic Left SDL°	E	14	17	15
Social Democratic Party of Slovakia SDSS°*	S		13	23
Public Against Violence VPN	S		2	4
Christian Democratic Movement of Slovakia KDH*	L			
Democratic Union of Slovakia DU*	L	48	17	16
Slovak Peasant's Movement AM°	L	31	15	12
Slovak Green Party SZS°*	L		1	4
Democratic Party DS*	L		2	6
Party of Civic Understanding SOP	L			13
total	150	150	150	150
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

° = 1992 Electoral Coalition 'Common Choice SV', * = 1998 Slovak Democratic Coalition SDK

Slovenia

Republic of Slovenia / Central Europe / total area 20,000 sq.km / pop. 2.0 m. / Capital: Ljubljana / Constitution of 1991 / State Chamber - 90 MPs - 4 years / 88 PR; 2 ethnic minorities / State Council - 40 members -

Elections:

	06.12.92		10.11.96		15.10.2000	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia LDS	22	24.4%	25	27.8%	34	37.8%
Slovenian People's Party SLS+SKD	10	11.1%	19	21.1%	9	10%
Social Democratic Party of Slovenia SDSS	4	4.4%	16	17.8%	14	15.6%
New Slovenian Christian People's Party NSI					8	8.9%
Slovenian Christian-Democrats SKD	15	16.7%	10	11.1%		
United List of Social-Democrats ZLSD	14	15.6%	9	10.0%	11	12.2%
Slovenian National Party SNS	11	12.2%	4	4.4%	4	4.4%
Party of the Slovenia Youth SMS					4	4.4%
Democratic Party of Slovenia DSS	7	7.8%				
Greens of Slovenia ZS	5	5.6%				
Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia DeSUS			5	5.6%	4	4.4%
Italian Minority	1	1.1%	1	1.1%	1	1.1%
Hungarian Minority	1	1.1%	1	1.1%	1	1.1%
total	90	100.0%	90	100.0%	90	100.0%

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Ukraine

Republic Ukraine / Eastern Europe / total area 603,700 sq.km / pop. 49.15 m. / Capital: Kiev / Constitution of 1996 / Supreme Council - 450 MPs - 4 years / 225 single-seat; 225 PR

Elections:

	27.03.94 / 2.-10.04.94		29.03.98		30.3.2002	
	seats	%	seats	%	seats	%
Communist Party of Ukraine, KPU	86	19.1%	122	27.1%	66	14.7%
Peoples' Movement Rukh, R	20	4.4%	46	10.2%		
Victor Yushchenko Bloc Our Ukraine NU					112	24.9%
Peasant Party of Ukraine, (SelPU)	19	4.2%	34	7.6%		
Socialist Party of Ukraine, (SPU)			14	3.1%	24	5.3%
Green Party of Ukraine, PZU			19	4.2%		
For United Ukraine ZYU			29	6.4%	102	22.7%
Community "Hromada", H			23	5.1%		
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, (United) SDPU(o)	2	0.4%	16	3.6%	23	5.1%
Progressive Socialist Party, (PSP)			17	3.8%		
Julya Tymoshenko Election Bloc JT					21	4.7%
Unity					3	0.7%
DPU-DS					4	0.9%
Others/Non-partisans	323	68.7%	130	28.9%	95	21.1%
Total	450	100%	450	100.0%	450	100%

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Yugoslavia

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia / Southeast Europe / total area 102,000 sq.km / pop. 10.5 m. / Capital: Belgrade / Constitution of 1992 / Council of Citizens - 138 MPs - 4 years / 60 single-seat; 78PR / Council of Republics - 40 members - 20 from Serbia, 20 from Montenegro

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The following elections results in Yugoslavia are represented in two schemes for Serbia and Montenegro respectively

Chamber of Citizens Serbia (108 Deputies)**Elections:**

		20.12.92		3.11.96		24.09.2000
		seats	%	seats	%	seats
Socialist Party of Serbia - Yugoslav United Left SPS-JUL	P	47	43.5%	64	59.26%	44
New Democracy ND						
Serb Radical Party SRS	N	30	27.8%	16	14.81%	5
DEPOS (Democratic Opposition)/ Democratic Opposition of Serbia DOS ^o	M	20	18.5%			58
Democratic Party DS	M	5	4.6%			
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina DZVM	E	3	2.8%			
DS/RDSV (Reformat Democratic Party of Vojvodina)	L	2	1.9%			
DS/RDSV/GS		1	0.9%			
Zajedno: Serbian Renewal Movement SPO	L			22	20.07%	
Alliance of Vojvoda Hungarians SVM	E			3	2.78%	1
Coalition Vojvodina	E			2	1.85%	
Others	M			1	0.93%	
Total		108	100.0%	108	100.0%	108

^o = 2000 electoral coalition Democratic Opposition of Serbia consisting of 18 democratically oriented opposition parties

Chamber of Citizens Montenegro (30 Deputies)**Elections:**

		20.12.92		3.11.96		24.09.2000
		seats	%	seats	%	seats
Democratic Socialist Party of Montenegro DPS	P	17	56.7%	17	56.7%	
Socialist Party of Montenegro SPCG	P	5	16.7%	5	16.7%	
People's Party of Montenegro NSCC	L	4	13.3%	4	13.3%	
Serb Radical Party SRS	N	4	13.3%	4	13.3%	
Socialist People's Party of Montenegro SNPCCG	L					28
Serbia People's Party of Montenegro SNSCC	L					2
Others	M					
Total		30	100.0%	30	100.0%	30

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Source: Elections around the world www.electionworld.org in the period 01-09-2002 / 01-10-2002

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